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ABSTRACT  
This thesis studies the validity of unsecured interbank benchmark rates Euribor and Li-
bor. In addition to the representativeness issues arising from the decline of unsecured 
interbank market activity, the reference rates have been subject to manipulation. I re-
viewed the manipulation scandal, and the academic studies related to it and contributed 
to the academic literature with my own empirical analysis. In the analysis, I studied the 
implied risk spread of individual banks’ 12 month euro Libor submissions’ co-integration 
relationship to maturity matched credit default swap rates (CDS) of the corresponding 
banks. I found evidence that during the years 2007-2009 the manipulation was more 
widespread than what was considered by the authorities.  In addition, some banks con-
tinued (2009-) submitting rates that are not in line with their CDS rates. These findings 
speak for the necessity of ongoing reference rate reform. In addition, the methods pre-
sented in this thesis could be employed in the Libor quality monitoring. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Although Libor (London Interbank offered rate) is often called “the world’s most im-
portant number” (Abrantes-Metz & Evans, 2012) it is not a number, but actually a set of 
figures. To be precise, Libor is 37 figures that indicate interest rates of unsecured inter-
bank transactions in 5 different currencies, and those figures are referred by contracts 
with notional value of thousands of billions. As a result of recent developments in the 
money market and the manipulation scandal in the rate setting, one could easily argue 
that those rates have been broken, if not anymore, at least for some time. 
The history of the reference rates dates to 1980’s. At that time demand for standardized 
reference rate system grew together with the growth of popularity of financial deriva-
tive contracts (BBA libor, 2014). Since then reference rates such as Libor have been im-
portant institutions in the financial world (Brousseau, Chailloux, & Durré, 2013). Cur-
rently financial derivative contracts with nominal value of hundreds of thousands of bil-
lions have their cash flows determined by Libor and Euribor fixings (ECB, 2013a). Besides 
of derivative contracts, Libor and Euribor rates are used as reference rates in bank loans. 
For example, in Finland 93 % of mortgage stock is linked to Euribor rates (ECB, 2013a). 
In addition, reference rates provide useful information about ‘over the counter’ (OTC) 
interbank markets, which otherwise would be much more opaque. The reference rates 
are an important financial institution and their validity should be of great concern to the 
financial world. Invalid rates can cause substantial financial stability issues (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2013). 
The validity issues comes in many forms: those related to the lack of representativeness 
of the rates, and the one with greater emphasis in this thesis, the direct manipulation of 
the rates. The representativeness is related to the fact that the unsecured money mar-
ket is not as important source of bank funding as it used to be. Since the crisis the inter-
bank market activity has been contracting and especially in the longer term secured 
lending has replaced unsecured. The weakening link between bank funding conditions 
and reference rates causes a mismatch between the properties and the end use of ref-
erence rates. 
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To understand how the manipulation is possible, it is important to know how the rates 
are formed. Libor and Euribor rates are generated daily by panel that consists of the 
largest banks in their respective markets. Libor panel is located in London whereas Euri-
bor panel banks are mainly from euro countries. Neither of the reference rates are direct 
transaction-based rates, but instead, are formed based on expert judgment about pre-
vailing market rates. Libor and Euribor formation process was considered somewhat a 
trivial fact before the manipulation scandal. From 2005 till 2011 traders of panel banks 
were trying to push the rates to a direction that would benefit their own or bank’s good. 
Besides of portfolio manipulation, Barclays was found guilty of submitting lower Libor 
than actual unsecured funding rate. Barclays did this to avoid negative media attention. 
The representativeness issues and the manipulation scandal are interrelated. During the 
crisis, rate submission must have been challenging due to the lack of market data.  Low 
volume and low transparency in the underlying market made it difficult to separate ma-
nipulation from other sources of variation in the rates. Hence, it is not surprising that it 
took quite long before authorities started the investigations. Given the vital role of the 
reference rates in financial world and their high economic value, it is obvious that the 
manipulation scandal has sparked a lot of public discussion about the quality of the 
rates.  
1.1 STRUCTURE AND OBJECTIVES  
In this thesis, I study the reference rates validity mostly from the manipulation point of 
view. I start the thesis by describing in detail the two most important reference rates 
Libor and Euribor: what they are, how they are calculated and why such reference rates 
exist. In addition, I discuss of their representativeness in the current money market con-
text in the euro area. In chapter 2, I will go through the manipulation scandal, in which 
the British FSA/FCA1, the U.S. CFTC2 and the European Commission have been the main 
regulative authorities carrying out the investigations. 
                                                     
1 Financial Services authority/Financial conduct authority  
2 Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
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In chapter 3, I will present the scarce academic literature about the manipulations. I 
have divided the literature in to two groups based on their study methods: behavioural 
and market indicator studies. Behavioural studies include, for instance, the game theo-
retic approach done by Chen (2014), and Snider & Youle (2012) and Benford’s law appli-
cation by Abrantes-Metz et al. (2011). The market indicator studies include, for example, 
studies by Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012) and Monticini & Thornton (2013). Most of the 
studies flagged the possibility of manipulation even before the manipulation scandal 
started. 
Inspired by the market indicator studies, in the fourth chapter, which is my empirical 
part, I study the relationship of Libor and credit default swaps derivative contracts. Ac-
cording to theory, these two measures should be closely linked, as they both incorporate 
the credit risk component of the counterparty. Thus, there is an arbitrage condition be-
tween these two measures. If it does not hold, manipulation can be suspected. I study 
the long run relationship with co-integration method, something that has not been done 
before in interbank context. I am interested in the type of manipulation motivated by 
reputational issues, because the long term analysis does not capture the short term de-
viations of portfolio driven manipulation. 
The above-mentioned arbitrage condition in the interbank market is illustrated by 
Eisenschmid & Tapking (2008). However, due to the lack of directly relevant literature, I 
will employ the CDS and bond market research. With respect to my thesis, an important 
concept is the CDS-bond basis, and relevant studies of the field are, for example, De Wit 
(2006) and Zhu (2006). I will complement the CDS-bond basis studies with the literature 
that studies composition of money market spreads. For example, articles by Taylor & 
Williams (2008a,b) and Ji (2012) offer possible drivers for the Libor-OIS development. 
My empirical results imply that Barclays was not the only nor the most blatant reputa-
tion driven manipulator during the suspected period of manipulation in 2007-2008. The 
analysis supplements current academic literature of reference rates by extending the 
time period of analysis and employing methods that are not used in other manipulation 
nor money market studies. 
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1 REFERENCE INTEREST RATES AS A WINDOW TO INTERBANK 
MARKETS  
In this chapter I describe the purpose and formulation of important reference rates and 
go through the developments in the European interbank market. I will start by describ-
ing the most important features of the money markets, and the interbank markets, 
which is part of it. This is useful helping in understanding of the conceptual location of 
reference rates in financial theory. In the latter part of this chapter I will describe in 
detail how Libor and Euribor interbank unsecured benchmark rates are calculated, and 
what they are used for. I will also go over the general development of euro money mar-
kets since the introduction of euro. This description of money markets has been done 
from euro perspective, as my empirical part is studying euro related rates, but it is to 
large degree applicable to dollar and some other currencies as well (Hartmann & Vall, 
2008, p. 455). 
1.1 INTERBANK MARKETS ARE PART OF THE MONEY MARKETS  
Hartmann, Heider, Papaioannou, & Lo Duca (2008, p. 121) illustrate that the role of fi-
nancial system is to allocate resources from those with surplus to those with deficit. In 
other words, Hartman et al. (2008, p. 121) see financial system as a set of institutions 
through which households, commercial sector and public sector obtain funding or save 
funds. Money market can be considered to be one part of the financial system. (2008, 
p. 454).  
The particular economic function of money markets is to solve cash flow mismatches. 
Economic agents have, in practice, always mismatch between income and cost, in a 
given short period of time. Via money markets agents with a surplus, even for a short 
period, can deposit the surplus to those who are lacking funds. Hence, the money mar-
kets are channelling the funds from positive net savers to negative net savers, but at the 
same time, they are used to fine tune longer term fund inflows and outflows to match 
in a daily basis. This liquidity allocation process causes the money markets to have im-
portant role in financial stability, risk sharing and in maintaining price stability. 
(Hartmann & Vall, 2008, pp. 453-455)  
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Hartmann & Vall (2008, pp. 454-455) state that the supply side of money market offers 
place to hold cash with interest rate and thereby offers a way to lower the cost of hold-
ing cash. On the demand side participants have, in case of liquidity shock, possibility to 
get cash and thus, better ability to absorb liquidity shocks. Hence, money markets allow 
participants easily to invest funds for short term and also help in sharing the liquidity 
risks. All in all, instruments used in money markets, are such that allow for lowering the 
opportunity cost of cash, but still have relatively short duration and hence bear smaller 
risks. (2008, pp. 454-455) 
Money market is in practice a collection of different markets i.e. different traded instru-
ments and market places (Hartmann & Vall, 2008). Hartman and Vall (2008) divide 
money markets in to three components: 1) financial instruments and 2) market seg-
ments or market participants and 3) trading mechanisms and systems. I will go through 
these three. 
A good picture of European money market instruments can be obtained from ECB’s 
money market surveys (ECB, 2013b), which covers unsecured market, secured market, 
short-term securities and derivatives market.  According to (Hartmann & Vall, 2008)  in-
terbank lending is often considered the core. It consists of unsecured and secured lend-
ing. The unsecured market is most active in short maturities, whereas secured (and de-
rivative) markets are also used in the longer end of the maturities. Collaterals used in 
repos are mostly government bonds. Banks who are subject to reserve requirement use 
interbank markets in managing of the reserve requirement fulfilment and flows of their 
customers funds. (ECB, 2013b)  
Derivatives are used to hedge against interest rate risks, but can also be used to specu-
late on the future interest rate movements. Interest rate swaps, interest rate forwards, 
and futures are examples of interest rate derivatives. A general and stylized view is that 
financial instruments with maturity below one year belong to money market and instru-
ments with maturity over one year, are considered to belong to the capital markets. 
(Hartmann & Vall, 2008) 
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By market segments Hartman and Vall (2008) refer to different parties involved in the 
market. Banks and firms are the fundamental agents of the market. Especially in Europe, 
a number of big banks have also an important role as market makers. They are commit-
ted to quote price for given instrument when asked. Other important agents are market 
funds and large non-financials. However, the one with most influence is central bank. 
Central banks steer short term interest rates and often have short term rates as opera-
tional targets. Central banks rate decisions are highly anticipated events on the markets. 
Other important players are governments, who are mainly net borrowers. (Hartmann & 
Vall, 2008) 
Trading mechanism and system are the third money market component presented by 
Hartman and Vall (2008). It is very important to understand, that of the instruments 
described, most of trade is done on over the counter basis (OTC).  Exception of the rule 
are interest rate futures, which are traded on a dedicated marketplace like Euronext.liffe 
(London International Financial and futures and Option Exchange). In practice OTC deals 
are done via electronic trading platforms, direct dealing in phone or voice brokering. It 
is also noteworthy that the despite the European financial integration, conventions still 
vary across countries.  For example, Italy is the only country so far, where interbank 
deposits can be done via electronic trading system (e-MID) (Hartmann & Vall, 2008). 
Unfortunately, the OTC trading activity and turnover is not as easily observed as in ex-
changes (ECB, 2013a). The OTC nature of interbank markets offer one important expla-
nation to the question why reference rates are not formed directly from market trans-
actions. 
1.2 DEFINITIONS OF LIBOR AND EURIBOR  
In this subsection I provide definitions of Libor, Euribor, and Eonia. The Euribor and es-
pecially Libor are discussed thoroughly in this thesis, whereas Eonia and one particular 
derivative (Overnight indexed swap) linked to it are important in the empirical part of 
this thesis. Starting from 2013 the definitions of Libor and Euribor have been subject to 
changes, which were seen necessary after the manipulation scandal revealed some 
weaknesses. During the review period of my empirical part (2003-2013), these changes 
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were not implemented yet. To large extent these changes do not change the information 
what reference rates are believed to offer, but instead, they are made to ensure that 
the information represents what is believed.  
1.3 LIBOR  
Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate) is a benchmark of unsecured lending in London 
interbank markets. It is submitted every business day in five different currencies, Swiss 
franc, euro, British pound, Japanese yen and U.S dollar. Excluding euro, for each of the 
currencies multiple maturities are published. In 2013 publication of some tenors were 
abolished, but the remaining are following: overnight/spot-next, 1 week , 1 month, 2 
month, 3 month, 6 month, and 12 month. After reforms Euro has only two tenors: 1 
week and 1 month. All together its 37 maturity currency pairs that are published every 
business day (BBALibor, 2012). The rates are quoted as annualized rates and maturity 
dates are standardized according to ISDA norms, to ensure that each submitter in each 
currency/maturity pair refers to same dates. (BBAlibor, 2014b) 
Libor is an interbank unsecured lending rate, but it is not directly linked to market trans-
actions. Instead of market transaction in a particular market place, Libor is formed based 
on panel banks submissions. On every day when Libor is published, each member of 
each currency’s panel bank is asked the following question: “At what rate could you bor-
row funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a 
reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?” (BBAlibor, 2014b). Of the answers (rate 
submissions) a trimmed arithmetic mean is calculated. In case of Libor trimming means 
that 25 % of highest and lowest values are dropped out and the mean is then calculated 
from the remaining values. Purpose of trimming process is to exclude the outliers. 
(BBAlibor, 2014b) 
In practice Libor is a snapshot of banks’ subjective view of their unsecured funding con-
ditions at 11 a.m. London time. It is not assumed that banks would trade every day on 
each tenor they submit rates. Hence, they are encouraged to submit their best estimate 
on what the rate would be.  If the rates were based on only actual rates, there would be 
a risk that for some days the Libor could not be constructed. As stated by BBALibor 
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(2014), “it would not be feasible to create a full suite of LIBOR rates if this (real transac-
tion) was a requirement”. The above presented question Libor rates are based on has 
been in this form since 1998. (BBAlibor, 2014b) 
The question which defines Libor is supplemented by some other technical definitions. 
For example, the term “fund” is defined as “interbank cash or cash raised via primary 
issuance of interbank Certificates of Deposit.” In addition some quality requirements for 
the submission process exists. One example is that the staff member submitting the Li-
bor has to be primarily working in banks cash management (BBAlibor, 2014b).  
As stated above, Libor rates are published for different maturities and currencies. Each 
currencies have separate panel of banks. In this thesis the empirical part is focused on 
euro panel of Libor, but most of the academic literature is about US dollar, which is the 
most used reference rate. The Libor euro bank panel consisted of 15 members 
(BBALibor, 2012) during the period of my data. The Libor has been governed by British 
Banking Association (BBA), but the governance is moving to Nyse Euronext during the 
year 2014. Banks join the panel on voluntary basis, but governance organization ap-
proves them and manages the panel size. In addition to governance organization and 
panel banks other stakeholders in the rate setting process are the rate calculator and 
publisher. Currently these both roles are taken care by Thomson Reuters. 
According to BBA (2014b) the first time Libor was published was in 1980’s. Banks’ had 
asked their association to build a system that could be used as an “impartial basis” for 
interest on syndicated loans. Before standardized Libor rate was established in daily 
publication, often ad-hoc based panels were created to get impaired view of interest 
rate levels. Case for the standardization was obvious and Libor was created. Gradually 
financial derivative contracts started to use Libor as the underlying market interest rate 
i.e. reference rate. (BBAlibor, 2014c) 
1.4 EURIBOR  
In similar manner as Libor, Euribor (European interbank offered rate) is benchmark in-
terest rate for interbank unsecured lending. However, Euribor is currently published 
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only for euro denominated loans and the banks are, excluding few, geographically lo-
cated in the Eurozone. Like in Libor, also the Euribor rates are published every banking 
day. Euribor interest rates are quoted for 1 and 2 weeks and 1,2,3,4,6,9,12 months. 
(Euribor-EBF, 2013, p. 2) 
Besides the geographical location, there is one fundamental conceptual difference in 
Euribor and Libor, which is very relevant in credit risk terms of the rates. Where Libor 
banks are asked to quote their own lending, would that happen during that day, Euribor 
panel are asked what is the rate when hypothetical “prime bank” lends money (Euribor-
EBF, 2013). In fact, before 1998 Libor rate was formed in alike way, but as a result of 
consultation conference between BBA and market participants, the question was re-
formed to the current one (BBAlibor, 2014c). According to BBALibor (2014b), definition 
was changed because the prime bank term was not universally definable and it was seen 
as a good thing that the rates were explicitly linked to individual banks’ funding. 
The Euribor is defined in the code of conduct (Euribor-EBF) as follows: “Euribor® is the 
rate at which euro interbank term deposits are being offered within the EMU zone by 
one prime bank to another at 11.00 a.m. Brussels time. It is quoted for spot value (two 
Target days) and on actual / 360 day basis.” 
This is supplemented by the definition of the prime bank: “A ‘prime bank’ should be 
understood as a credit institution of high creditworthiness for short-term liabilities, 
which lends at competitive market related interest rates and is recognised as active in 
euro-denominated money market instruments while having access to the Eurosystem’s 
(open) market operations.” (Euribor-EBF, 2013, p. 2).  
Before October 2013, when new code of conduct came into effect, term prime bank was 
undefined. Improving the definitions of key terms was not the only thing done in the 
process. New Euribor code of conduct is, in terms of pages, together with appendices 
over 40 pages, whereas the older was solely 9 pages (Euribor-EBF, 2011). From this naive 
comparison of the number of pages, one can get a good picture the scale of reforms 
Euribor has been subject to. The reforms are further discussed in the section 2.2 of this 
thesis. 
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The technical calculation process of Euribor is similar to Libor. The panel consists of 26 
banks (4/21/2014)3. The final Euribor rate is trimmed average, where the 15 % of highest 
and lowest values are excluded. The Euribor is published in accuracy of three decimals. 
Publication and calculation processes are managed by a private company Thomson Reu-
ters. EBF manages the panel, but banks join it on voluntary basis. (Euribor-EBF, 2013) 
1.4.1  D IFFERENCES  O F EURI BOR  AN D L I BO R   
It is important to highlight the differences between Euribor and Libor from the credit 
risk perspective. At first glance, the two interbank benchmark rates seem somewhat 
same. However, because Euribor is quoted for prime bank, the credit risk component of 
Euribor is not linked to any bank particular, but instead, represents a trimmed average 
of panel banks’ subjective thoughts of some prime bank’s credit risk. If the perception 
of prime bank (and its credit risk profile) stays fixed, the credit risk component of Euribor 
rate should stay relatively fixed as well. In other words, the credit risk component of 
Euribor moves only, if the perceived risk of European prime banks moves. Yet, the per-
ception of prime bank is far from unanimous among participants based on study by 
Taboga (2013).  
The credit risk component of Libor can, in theory, be much more easily tracked: each 
panel bank can be accounted for a certain credit risk component based on their rate 
submissions (see section 4.2 of this thesis). Libor submission may also have signalling 
value of submitting banks’ credit conditions unlike Euribor. 
Because Euribor is loosely anchored to some particular credit risk, without making very 
specific assumptions of the credit profile of a prime bank, it is hard to justify the use of 
no-arbitrage condition to explain individual banks Euribor submissions. Hence, I can only 
study Libor rates with the method I use in the empirical part. 
                                                     
3 There used to be over 40 panel banks, but since the manipulation scandal the number has been declining 
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1.5 EONIA  
Eonia (euro area overnight indexed average) is overnight lending interbank benchmark 
rate, which contrary to Euribor and Libor, is directly calculated from market transactions. 
More precisely, Eonia is weighted average of the rate, at which Eonia panel banks lend 
money overnight to other credit institutions. Eonia is unsecured and only includes euro 
denominated loans. Unlike Libor and Euribor, Eonia is not a snapshot of money market 
conditions, because the overnight lending deals can be agreed on during the whole day 
before Target system close, and hence, the window of rate determination is longer than 
in Euribor or Libor. I will not go further into details of Eonia, as Eonia as a reference rate 
is not under examination in this thesis. Instead, Eonia is an important part of the risk 
free rate indicator used: overnight indexed swap (OIS). OIS’s are further discussed in the 
empiric part of this thesis. (Euribor-EBF, 2014b) 
1.6 ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF REFERENCE INTEREST RATES  
Reference rates in general are a public good. Standardized rates increase the efficiency 
of contracts such as financial derivatives, which reallocate the risk in financial system 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Trough derivatives and hedging reference 
rates are also directly linked to the money market (ECB, 2013a). Besides acting as refer-
ence for contracts, the rates play the role of a pricing benchmark. Hence, Libor and Eu-
ribor function as benchmarks and pricing references. In this subsection I will clarify these 
roles. 
The economic efficiency value of reference rates lies in the standardization gains (Hou 
& Skeie, 2013; Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Before introduction of Libor in 
the 1980’s in each derivative contract the referable rate had to be separately decided. 
In addition of being costly, this was also considered to hinder the growth of market (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2013, p. 4).  
From the financial market point of view, the most important role of Euribor and Libor is 
being the reference rate of derivative contracts. According to ECB (2013a) the notional 
value of contracts linked to Euribor and Libor is approximately 490 trillion dollars. A typ-
ical Libor or Euribor linked instrument is interest rate future, which variable leg cash flow 
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is determined by the settlement dates rate fixings. Interest rate derivatives, like futures, 
forwards and interest rate swaps are highly standardized and liquid. They help pricing 
other less liquid interest rate and credit products. Thus reference rates affect indirectly 
in pricing of some less known instruments (ECB, 2013a).  
The importance of derivatives is a subject of its own, and I will not go deeply into that. 
In the big picture, well-functioning and efficient derivative markets reduce the cost of 
risk allocation in the financial system (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Fur-
thermore, the interest rate derivatives are particularly important for banks as their busi-
ness is, to be simple, to borrow short and lend long. As Hou & Skeie (2013) put it: with 
help of Libor and its derivatives, banks are able to fix their returns and costs with a mar-
gin.  
The important role of reference rates does not end in derivatives. In Europe, 60 % of 
total loans to non-financial corporations and 40 % of total to households are linked to 
floating rates (ECB, 2013a). A typical loan rate is often banks margin plus Euribor. Given 
the direct link in households’ and corporations’ loans cost and important role in for-
mation of interest rate expectations, reference rate are vital transmission channel of 
central banks’ monetary policy. In addition, Eonia for example, is also a reference rate, 
and ECB’s operational target. According to BIS (Bank for International Settlements, 2013, 
pp. 10-12) references rate have important implications in monetary policy transmission 
and financial stability. For extensive discussion of reference rates and central banks see 
BIS report on the matter (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). 
As was described in chapter 1, in OTC markets the transactions are not necessarily stand-
ardized, public or practically visible for the public. Hence, reference rates can be a good 
(stylized) proxy of the markets they represent (ECB, 2013a). Reference interest rates 
play important role in formation on expectations of future rates (ECB, 2013a). Via ex-
pectations, reference rates are indirectly linked to capital markets, which consist of 
bonds and other longer term instruments (Brousseau, Chailloux, & Durré, 2013). An-
other benefit of benchmark rates is the expert judgement involved in the rates: For ex-
ample, in the case of Euribor, we have 12 month interest rate for every banking date, 
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despite we do not necessarily have any actual transaction on every date. All in all, bench-
mark rates provide the public with a snapshot of money market interest rate curve, 
which contains simplified information about the otherwise opaque market. 
1.7 DEVELOPMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN INTERBANK MARKET   
As has been discussed above Euribor and Libor are representing interbank unsecured 
interest rates, and they have an important direct link to money markets through deriv-
ative contracts. Hence, it is important to know how money market, especially the unse-
cured segment, has developed over time. In this chapter I will shortly describe the con-
ceptual changes happened in the money market since the establishment of reference 
rates, and second, describe the market activity during euro era in greater detail. One will 
find that the validity of reference interest rates as a bank funding measure has suffered 
as a result of decline in unsecured money market activity and fragmentation of unse-
cured markets. By fragmentation I mean the country and counterparty based risk varia-
tion across banks i.e. market participants.  
1.7.1  PAR ADIGM SHIFT  IN  MONEY MAR K ETS   
In IMF’s working paper Brousseau, Chailloux and Durré (2013) present the idea of para-
digm shift. They argue that during the 1980’s, when Libor was established, money mar-
ket and interbank market were practically a synonym. Back then the money markets 
were bank centric and bulk of banks refinancing was done via interbank operations. In 
this context, given limited credit risk variation, it is obvious that Libor rate fixings were 
accurate proxies for banks’ funding costs. It was especially accurate for those banks, who 
did not have large deposit base. (Brousseau, Chailloux, & Durré, 2013, pp. 4-5) 
The paradigm started gradually evolve together with growth of fund management in-
dustry and bond markets in Europe. Market participants of new kind appeared during 
the high pace deregulation period of the 90’s. Traditional interbank markets were com-
plemented by so called non-banks, funds, central banks of other currencies and together 
they were the new roster of players at the money markets. These developments increas-
ingly pushed down the interbank market volume in absolute and relative terms of the 
total money market activity. (Brousseau, Chailloux, & Durré, 2013, pp. 5-6) 
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The new funding channels generated by the new players were seen more appealing in 
the context of relaxing regulatory environment.  Deposits were moving to from banks to 
non-bank, like funds. Trend was that more and more banks were net borrowers of funds 
instead of net lenders. In addition, asymmetric treatment of unsecured borrowing (reg-
ulated) and lending (not regulated) by Basel capital regulation, caused banks to only 
borrow in the unsecured market and do lending in other forms like repos. Same time, 
reference rate linked derivatives’ notional amount continued to grow. (Brousseau, 
Chailloux, & Durré, 2013) 
 
FIGURE 1.1  ILLUSTRATION OF MONEY MARKET CONCEPTUAL CH ANGES, (SOURCE:  BROUSSEAU,  CHAILLOUX,  &  DURRÉ,  2013) 
1.7.2  EURO  ER A AND THE F I NAN CI AL CRI SI S  
Hartmann & Val (2008) describe the euro money market as liquid and efficient market. 
They claim that this was evident from the day one of euro introduction (2008, p. 456).  
However, their analysis is before the crisis years in 2007-2008. The period of market 
functioning is also visible in the figure 1.2, which shows how the turnover of unsecured 
money markets in 2003-2008 stayed relatively constant. 
According to ECB’s Financial Integration report (2013c, pp. 15-17) the collapse of Leh-
man Brothers changed the nature of money markets in a remarkable way: banks became 
suspicious of each other banks’ ability to raise fund and pay back its debt. Before that 
the money markets were somewhat standardize markets (Hartmann & Vall, 2008, p. 
456), but now each banks was concerned of counterparty’s creditworthiness and default 
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risk. Interest rate did not work to compensate for higher credit risk, but instead, banks 
stopped lending to each other’s. Cross-border trade declined the most. (ECB, 2013c, pp. 
15-17). 
Figure 1.2 shows how the unsecured interbank market activity in 2013 was just a fraction 
of what it was in 2008. In figure 1.3 is shown how market participants consider unse-
cured market significantly less efficient than before the crisis. The declining pace in vol-
umes and quality was fastest during the financial crisis 2008.  
 
 
FIGURE 1.2  TURNOVER OF UNSECURED INTERBANK MARKET (SOURCE:  ECB, 2013B, P.  13) 
 
FIGURE 1.3  THE SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF UNSECURED MONEY MARKET EFFICIENCY.  HOW EFFICIENT MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
CONSIDER THE MONEY MARKET UNSECURED SEGMENT (SOURCE:  ECB, 2013B, P.  13) 
Other segments of money market were also under pressure, but not to the same extent. 
The growth trend in secured market stabilized. See figure 1.4. Also the collateral credit 
quality used in repos started to play bigger role in the pricing. The effect was even 
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stronger when both the collateral and borrower where from same country. Derivatives 
were also less traded, especially OIS, futures and others without currency dimension. 
This can be observed from the figure 1.5. Volume in FX-swaps did actually increase even 
over the years of most market stress. (ECB, 2012, pp. 23-26, 31-48) 
ECB  
FIGURE 1.4  SECURED MARKET TURNOVER (SOURCE:  ECB,  2013B, P.  33) 
ECB has also conducted a special data collection exercise, in which all the participating 
banks reported their daily interbank activity over the first two months of 2012 and the 
second half of 2012 (ECB, 2013a, p. 78). The exercise revealed devastating results from 
the perspective of reference rate representativeness. Volumes of even rather short term 
unsecured interbank markets were found low and often concentrated to only few par-
ticipants. Some of the results are described in table 1.2. (ECB, 2013a, p. 78). The declin-
ing trend in the unsecured money market is also discussed in report by BIS (2013, p.8).  
 
 
FIGURE 1.5  TURNOVER OF VARIOUS OTC  DERIVATIVES MARKETS (SOURCE:  ECB,  2013B, P.  18) 
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TABLE 1.1  F INDINGS OF ECB DATA EXERCISE (SOURCE:  ECB,  2013A, P.  80) 
 
In future the money markets are also subject to increased regulation. Coming regula-
tions directives like LCR (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) and CRD IV (Capital Requirements Di-
rective) treat unsecured lending more strictly than secured, which, in turn, will make 
secured lending more appealing for banks (ECB, 2013a, p. 75). 
1.7.3  REFERENCE RATES  IN  THE CUR R ENT  MON EY  MARK ET  CONT EXT  
As stated above, the activity in unsecured money markets has been decreasing over 
time.  Hence, the markets Libor and Euribor represent are not as important as they used 
to be back in the 1990’s or even in the beginning of the 2000’s. Back then, the unsecured 
rate was a very good proxy for overall wholesale funding cost of a bank. As was discussed 
in previous subsection, in 2010’s the share of secured lending is in remarkably bigger. 
As Broussea et al. (2013) puts it:  it is  recognized that the average whole sale funding 
cost of a bank is a complex combination of unsecured borrowing, secured borrowing (in 
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which collateral quality must be taken into account), central bank access, access to dif-
ferent currencies’ market places and multiple more variables (Brousseau, Chailloux, & 
Durré, 2013). The fundamentally changed funding profile of banks has raised the doubts 
of the representativeness of Libor and Euribor (BIS, 2013, p.8; ECB 2013a). In addition to 
representativeness issues, it makes the formation process of reference rates also ques-
tionable, as there are no real transactions were the rates could be anchored to. 
How big a problem the lack of representativeness is depends on what is expected from 
the behaviour of references rates. The downside of standardization is what is lost when 
derivative contracts are not tailored exactly to match the needs (BIS, 2013, p.7). To-
gether with the grown variation of credit risk among end users, grows possibly the mis-
match between reference rates’ properties and end use (BIS, 2013, p.7). In case of hedg-
ing, it is very important that the link between risk variable, like funding cost, and hedging 
instrument is predictable. If this link breaks down the hedging instruments may cause 
additional risks.  
Brousseau, Chailloux, & Durré (2013) point out that interest rate derivatives are often 
used hedging against variables that move in tandem with reference rates. Because de-
rivatives linked to Libor and Euribor rates have huge markets and liquidity, it is often 
cheaper to use proxy-hedging, than direct hedging. As a result, proxy hedging can be 
regarded as a significant phenomenon related to reference rates. (Brousseau, Chailloux, 
& Durré, 2013)  
Given the large direct and indirect hedging activities related to Libor, the financial sta-
bility risk related to unpredictable or even invalid reference interest is potentially very 
dangerous. In addition, if the invalid reference rates lead to falsely priced risk compo-
nents in the market, it can also lead to inefficiently priced risk in the market. 
From the central bank point of view the mechanism between policy rate and reference 
rate can be of great importance, as the reference rates are important part of interest 
rate channel. If this relationship behaves in an unpredicted way, than the policy decision 
based on reference rates may have unanticipated consequences. (BIS, 2013, p.11) 
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Now one should shift his mind into a banks money market desk. That is a typical desk 
which is responsible of banks daily Libor and/or Euribor submissions. During the crisis 
many banks lost their access to unsecured money markets but did not lose their place 
in reference rate bank panel. What resulted was that banks with little to none unsecured 
deals were using expert judgment to produce representative money market rates. Rates 
that for some days did not exists! For example, corresponding markets of 3 month Euri-
bor, which is referred by contracts worth of billions of dollars, had no trades on 13 % of 
dates according to a data exercise conducted by the ECB (ECB, 2013a, p. 79).  
The missing evident market transactions caused the reference rate to have no valid rate 
to compare with. This gave experts in charge of submissions a huge levy of determina-
tion as the accountability of submissions was nearly non-existent. Point of this example 
is to show, that the validity of both Libor and Euribor rates could have been easily ques-
tioned since the onset of financial crisis.  
In the next chapter I will break down the manipulation scandal, which is one symptom 
of the broken reference rates, in detail: who did what wrongdoing, what were their in-
centives and how did this all happen. However, even thought it might be generally ac-
cepted idea that crisis was catalyst for manipulation, it is not the cause of it: manipula-
tion did happen already in 2005. As one can see from the figure 1.2, unsecured markets 
were still relatively active during that year. 
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2 INTEREST REFERENCE RATE MANIPULATION SCANDAL  
In this chapter I will present the stylized timeline of the manipulation scandal: the 
wrongdoing, doubts, investigations, prosecutions. In the end of this chapter, I will 
shortly present some of that discussion done about the reforms of reference rates. The 
interest reference rate scandal is often referred in media as “Libor scandal”, because 
that is where the doubts of manipulation initially originated. Nonetheless, as this chap-
ter will show, Libor and Euribor scandals are very integrated together. One should 
reckon with the fact that banks participating in Libor referring markets are  to large ex-
tend the same ones doing business in euro area, which is the corresponding market of 
Euribor.  
Manipulation were of two kind: portfolio driven, and reputation driven. The motive for 
portfolio driven manipulation is to increase mainly derivative portfolios return. Reputa-
tion manipulation happened, because high Libor submissions relative to others were 
feared to be regarded as a signal of funding problems. 
2.1 MANIPULATIONS :  AN ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM? 
“IN A DEVELOPMENT THAT HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR BORROWERS EVERYWHERE, FROM 
RUSSIAN OIL PRODUCERS TO HOMEOWNERS IN DETROIT, BANKERS AND TRADERS ARE 
EXPRESSING CONCERNS THAT THE LONDON INTER-BANK OFFERED RATE, KNOWN AS LI-
BOR, IS BECOMING UNRELIABLE.” WALL STREET JOURNAL APRIL 16 2008 
(MOLLENKAMP, LIBOR FOG: BANKERS CAST DOUBT ON KEY RATE AMID CRISIS, 2008) 
British FSA’s (Financial Service Authority) final notice to Barclays, is to my knowledge, 
the first official allegation of reference rate scandal. Barclays was found guilty of sub-
mitting rates in a way that was violating the rules set by Libor code of conduct (FSA, 
2012a).  The allegations were for two type of misconduct4. The first type misconduct 
                                                     
4 As a results of manipulation, banks were convicted of failures in internal process, incompliances with 
respective code of conducts. However, the ultimate reason for the lawsuit has been the manipulation or 
manipulation-attempt and other allegations are just by-product of it. The scope of the thesis is in the 
manipulated rates, not in the internal processes, and hence, I will not go further into details of what have 
banks technically been accused of. 
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was the case of submitting rates in which banks traders’ derivative positions were taken 
into account. The other case was intentional submitting of lower than actual borrowing 
rates in fear of negative media content. Both of types of misconduct were violating code 
of conduct, which requires banks to submit the rates based on their best estimate of 
what the actual borrowing rate would be – other circumstances must not be considered 
in submissions.  
Type two manipulation, the avoiding of negative media attention, is only related to Li-
bor, in which, by definition, banks are submitting their own funding costs. Manipulation 
occurred under circumstances where banks did not trust each other and were afraid of 
possible bankruptcies or defaults. Barclays’ higher than others banks’ Libor submissions 
was actually noted in financial media, see for example Bloomberg’s article by Gilbert 
(2007), which in turn resulted in a bank’s management guidance to lower the submis-
sions.  
Evidence (email and phone conversations) presented in FSA’s final notice to Barclays 
(FSA, 2012a), show how mid-level management explicitly told money market desk em-
ployee’s to submit rates to levels “ where others quote Libor”. Unfortunately, it is not 
clear were the order originated from. It is not proven wrong that mid-level management 
might have just misinterpret the top-managements guidelines. Regardless of all, Bar-
clays settled the allegation of this type among others allegations (FSA, 2012a). Barclays 
is, to my best knowledge, the only bank which has been convicted of lowering submis-
sions to avoid negative publicity. 
How did the manipulation happen in practice? In the investigation of Barclays It was 
found that several times, when media notices Barclays submissions were in the upper 
quartile of submissions, the mid-level management of Barclays told their subordinates 
to “put the Libor where the Libor is” or something alike (FSA, 2012a). The most blatant 
examples where the cases were actual transactions were done during that day, but mid-
management overrode transactions offered by submitters and required the submission 
to be lower than the actual transactions (FSA, 2012a, p. 26). As stated above and in the 
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final notice report, this violates the code of conduct by not being, obviously, the best 
estimate of banks current interbank cost in given maturity. 
Despite the fact that Barclays might be the only one who has been convicted of lowering 
rates to avoid negative media attention, the idea (or doubts at least) of other panel 
banks doing the same have been under speculation in media and public. One of the first 
times officially the question of low rates was raised was in in Bank of England sterling 
money market liaison meeting in November 2007. Meeting’s minutes state that “Several 
group members thought that Libor fixings had been lower than actual traded interbank 
rates through the period of stress” (Bank of England, 2007). Probably less known to the 
public is the ICAP’s (broker/dealer company) weekly newsletter from 3rd of September 
2007, which even before the meeting of Bank of England, raised similar questions. 
In 2008 Wall Street Journal published series of articles are the most cited main stream 
financial articles (Mollenkamp, 2008; Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, 2008b) credited for 
bringing the issue of too low Libor submissions to the awareness of the general public. 
The main conclusion of WSJ article (Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, 2008b) is that several 
banks had been submitting lower than their actual borrowing cost. The claims were 
based on comparison of the banks’ credit default swap and their respective Libor sub-
missions, which, according to the article, were contradictory. The article can be consid-
ered to be an important milestone in reference rate scandal due its high media influ-
ence. Furthermore, a few academic studies have used alike but more sophisticated 
methods in trying to answer the same questions. In addition to the public discussion, it 
is now known that many noteworthy private discussions were taken between banks 
management and officials in U.K and U.S (Hou & Skeie, 2013). Above presented discus-
sion in media suggests that the submitting of low rates was more widespread than what 
one might asses on basis of authorities’ decisions so far: only Barclays was found guilty. 
Most of the manipulation allegations that have been covered in media is about the port-
folio driven manipulation. Banks submitted Libor rates in coordination with money mar-
ket traders who in turn benefited of the crooked Libor through their net positions in 
derivatives. Inquiries were done inter and intra bank. Based on FSA/FCA different final 
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notices, the Rabobank is the one with longest period of manipulation, from 2005 to 2011 
(FCA, 2013). However, FT article of a former bank insider claims that Libor has been ma-
nipulated since 1991 (Keenan, 2012). 
A comprehensive description of how type derivative position based manipulations hap-
pened in practice can be found in FSA’s/FCA’s final notices to banks (for example see 
FCA, 2013). A typical case is where derivative dealer asks same or other banks submitter 
to submit extremely low or high Libor fixing, because the dealer has a big derivative 
position expiry on that day. Often the dates of rates manipulation were so called inter-
national money market days (IMM-days)5 which are important settlement dates of in-
terest rate derivatives. Like stated above, these inquiries were both internal and exter-
nal. Given the trimming mechanism of Libor and Euribor, the more banks join in the rate 
collusion the more likely is the manipulation to succeed.  
Beginning from Barclays in summer 2012, there has been numerous manipulation re-
lated lawsuits. For example, FSA has fined RBS, ICAP, UBS and latest one is RABO bank 
in December 2013. The same banks were fined by the U.S commodity and futures trad-
ing commission (CFTC) and it was done in cooperation with national authorities (CFTC, 
2013). In December 2013 European Commission (2013) imposed a penalty on nine banks 
of cartel in Libor and/or Euribor submissions. In all above cases the banks agreed to set-
tle with the authorities, which in turn, discounted their final penalty fee significantly. For 
example, UBS and Barclays were found guilty, yet they were released of paying penalties 
due to their whistle blowing (European Comission, 2013). Commission still has active 
investigations considering those banks who did not accept to settle in this case. 
The legal acts are not limited to those presented above. However, acts are highly decen-
tralized, which makes the tracking of them task of its own. Financial Times estimated in 
December 4th (Barker, Schäfer, & Binham, 2013) that the total sum of penalties to be 
                                                     
5 IMM-dates are days when standardized futures expire. The idea behind the concept is to bundle futures 
to certain dates to get appropriate market volume for each future. 
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$5,8 billion. In addition, Barker, Schäfer and Binham (2013) estimated that alone in U.S 
there were over 50 lawsuits in progress. 
First wave of lawsuits were against corporations but now courtrooms are also judging 
individuals (Fleming, 2014). In addition, the banks have cancelled bonuses from those 
dealers who have been found guilty of manipulation (Fleming, 2014). In general, top 
management of banks have underlined the fact that they have not been aware, let alone 
ordered for illegal actions. So far all legal actions against individuals have been targeted 
to midlevel management and below (Fleming, 2014). Nonetheless, it is not only one or 
two banks whose CEOs have resigned as result of the crisis.  
Another interesting question is: why Barclays is so far the only bank convicted of media 
attention driven manipulation? As stated above, it seems like, that besides media, even 
market participants (ICAP, BoE liaison meeting) were worried of the rates. If Barclays 
had been the only bank to submit lower than actual rates, the wide spread worries 
would have been exaggerated. In the empirical part of my thesis I try to tackle this issue, 
and see, if Barclays stand outs of the others somehow. 
2.2 AFTERMATH OF THE SCANDAL  
Because of the scandal, the reference rate reform has been discussed broadly in the 
public. In economic sense the reference rates have been relatively loosely anchored on 
the banks’ real funding costs. Since the representativeness of the rates has been wors-
ening it has been a good point to rethink reference rates validity. The validity issue was 
there even without the manipulation. Crisis and manipulations revealed plenty of vul-
nerabilities in the current reference rate regimes. Both, the conceptual properties and 
the rate setting process of reference rate has been subject to public discussion. 
What it comes to media publicity, FSA’s Wheatley report is probably the one with most 
of it. Report named after the CEO of FSA Martin Wheatley analysed the failures in the 
Libor of that time and proposed, based on discussion initiative launched in summer 
2012, a number of reform ideas (FSA, 2012b). The report did not recommend a totally 
new reference rate regime, but instead argued that Libor should be reformed. After 
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Wheatley’s report, the European banking Association (EBA) and European Securities and 
Market Authority (ESMA) have given their joint suggestion of Euribor reform (ESMA-
EBA, 2013). International Organization of Securities Commissions published guidelines 
for financial benchmarks, which did cover, not only rates, but benchmarks in general 
(IOSCO, 2013). The reforms done to Libor were based on recommendations in Wheatley 
Report (BBA, 2013) and reforms done to Euribor were based on EBA-ESMA recommen-
dations (Euribor-EBF, 2014). However, the recommendations are to large extent similar.  
In Wheatley report (FSA, 2012b, pp. 79-80) the main weaknesses of Libor regime that 
time were as follows. First, it was acknowledged that particularly during periods of mar-
ket stress, panel banks may have incentive to lower submissions to signal better credit-
worthiness. Second, panel banks are both, makers and end users of reference rate. Since 
the end users often have values of assets and/or liabilities very sensitive to changes in 
Libor, the combined maker and end-user status has obvious conflicts of interest: banks 
have incentives to submit rates that favour their positions in their balance sheet. Wheat-
ley report argues that the three failings of Libor system are in 1) mechanism 2) govern-
ance and regulation framework and 3) regulatory powers and sanctions. Also it was 
pointed out, that the submissions should be based on transactions whenever it is possi-
ble. The report resulted a reform proposal of ten points (FSA, 2012b, pp. 8-9). These 
same failures and proposal are also to large extend recognized in ESMA/EBA joint rec-
ommendations (ESMA-EBA, 2013).  
The following reforms are done according to the recommendations and aim to fix the 
presented sources of weaknesses. Most visible changes done to both Libor and Euribor 
were the suspension of certain rates. In Euribor, maturities with insufficiently consid-
ered underlying market volume where suspended. Whereas in Libor, some currencies 
were totally dropped out and the other currencies lost least active maturities. By active, 
it was referred to rates that had neither active underlying interbank market nor deriva-
tive market referring to them. Another visible change was done to fix the Libor underre-
porting incentive issue: the publishing of individual submissions are lagged by three 
months. Thus the panel banks do not have immediate reasons to be scared of the media 
attention submissions possibly get. (FSA, 2012b; Euribor-EBF, 2014)  
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From economist point of view, reforms with least interest are those related to internal 
and external reporting. Under the new code of conducts, panel banks are required to 
have improved their internal processes. For example, banks must have predetermined 
systemic plan for data submission, which is reviewed regularly (Euribor-EBF, 2013; BBA 
Libor, 2013b). Banks are obliged to report all employees who are in charge of bidding 
and part of the determination process. Any person, who is involved in the process, is not 
allowed to be money market derivative dealer or any of a kind. In addition to improve-
ments in the actual rate setting process, governing organisation and calculation agent 
are doing back testing, in order to verify the validity of rates. (Euribor-EBF, 2013; BBA 
Libor, 2013b).The governance of Libor has moved from BBA to NYSE Euronext over the 
year 2014.  
Many banks have decided to exit the Euribor panel as a results of the scandal. Official 
reasons banks have reported are often related to the challenging environment of rate 
determination i.e. lack of market activity. However, I dare to argue that banks have done 
their cost benefit analysis and arrived to the conclusion that costs exceed benefits. Costs 
have indeed risen in form of the regulation. Cynical observer could say that benefits 
have declined as well, because manipulation is not possible anymore. 
Not all have been fully satisfied with the reference rate reforms. For example, Abrantes-
Metz & Evans (2012) propose that Libor should have both, offer and bid prices, and the 
submitting banks should be committed to do transactions with given prices. According 
to my knowledge, the Helibor system if Finland had this feature. One branch of refer-
ence rate reform discussion is the idea of forming a totally new reference rate. As is 
pointed out in the BIS report (2013) the reference rate properties should be closely re-
lated to its use. As is pointed out in subsection 1.7, the modern bank funding is complex 
combination of different funding forms. Therefore, it might be that in the future multiple 
reference are used. BIS (2013) calls this concept as a “menu of different reference rates”. 
The subject is interesting, but I will not go further into the details of possible new rates 
and reforms, as the subject could be a thesis of its own. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW OF MANIPULATION STUDIES  
Major of the academic literature regarding manipulations is published in last two years 
and most of the literature is still in form of working paper. The first papers are written 
in 2008 (example Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz, & Seow, 2011), which is shortly after 
Libor became subject to manipulation speculation in media. The legal investigations 
mentioned in the previous chapter have their focus on the direct acts related on manip-
ulation. Sometimes the style is referred as “smoking gun” approach (Snider & Youle, 
2012, p. 4). The Smoke (i.e. the evidence) was in forms of emails and recorded phone 
calls. These explicitly proved the wrongful acts.  
In financial academic literature the approach is different. Instead of explicit private evi-
dence, literature mostly relies on public data and is also interested to view the matter 
in broader perspective. I divide the academic studies in two groups based on the ap-
proach selected. First group are studies, which compare Libor submissions to market 
measures. The remaining group is something I call behaviour model approach, in which, 
game theory, forensic theory, antitrust methods, or combination is often used. The com-
mon feature of these studies is that they often build their model on a hypothesis of what 
either dishonest or honest submission behaviour looks like. Hence, putting all together, 
I have divided manipulation research in three different groups based on the approach 
used: smoking gun (previous chapter), market indicators, and behaviour model. 
3.1 BEHAVIOURAL MODELS OF MANIPULATIVE PANEL BANKS  
Chen (2013) approaches the Libor submission process from game theoretic perspective. 
He builds a model on assumption that all banks are strategic bidders i.e. each Libor sub-
mission are input of a payoff function per panel banks’ rate. Thus, each banks has a bid-
ding strategy which maximizes the expected pay out. He assumes that portfolio gains of 
Libor fixings are maximized with low Libor fixings. Chen then argues that banks’ manip-
ulation gains are the bigger the bigger is the maturity mismatch6 of respective bank bal-
                                                     
6 Maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities 
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ance sheet. Thus, bigger maturity mismatch would imply higher motivation for manipu-
lation, ceteris paribus. In the model he assumes that each bank has same maturity mis-
match parameter. The cost of manipulation he assumes to be linear function of the level 
of seriousness of manipulation, that is, the spread between actual loan cost and submis-
sion. The justification is that regulator is more likely to fine bank who submits rate far 
from the actual borrowing cost. He then builds two different scenarios: one with signal-
ling effects and second without. In signalling, bank is assumed to have costs’ in form of 
expected bank run, which is higher the higher is banks relative submission. (Chen, 2013) 
The conclusions of model with signalling is that banks report lower than actual costs. 
What more, Chen’s (2013, pp. 20-21) model imply that maximum submitted amount is 
always lower than what is truly highest borrowing cost. The bigger is bank’s credit risk, 
the bigger is the bias of Libor fixing. The gain from under reporting is higher even if only 
the perception of banks credit worthiness by audience goes down and the actual funda-
mentals remain same. Hence, the market turmoil causes the Libor bias to grow. Study 
suggests that individual submission should not be published and be only information of 
the regulator. (Chen, 2013) 
Even if no signalling exists, Libor bias relative to the maturity mismatch in balance sheet, 
exists. However, Chen (2013) suggests a payment system linked to submission, which 
would make it optimal for panel banks to submit the real best estimates of borrowing 
costs. Another important conclusion of the study is that Libor bias grows if banks bor-
rowing cost dispersion grows. The intuition behind is that banks have more space for 
bidding low. (Chen, 2013) 
A bit similar to Chen’s model, is the one offered by Snider & Youle (2012). They recognize 
that there is a cost for misreporting which is bigger the bigger is the difference between 
misreported rate and the actual borrowing rate. Given this cost and banks willingness 
for strategic bidding, banks pursue to submit rates which are just out of the trimmed 
mean. In USD Libor panel there are 16 panel banks quoting 16 rates, of which four lowest 
and highest values are trimmed off before the mean is calculated. Hence, given that the 
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costs of manipulation is relative to the spread between real and submitted rate, submit-
ting either fourth highest (prefer high Libor) or 13th lowest (prefer low Libor rate), are in 
other words, the cheapest places to effect the actual Libor fixing. (Snider & Youle, 2012) 
The model by Snider and Youle (2012) suggests, that if strategic bidding existed, there 
should be “bunching” near the expected boundary values. They test this assumption 
against evidence and find, significant results. From forensic perspective, the limitation 
of their model is that data is needed over time, and hence, “pinpointing” particular case 
of manipulation is impossible. They also point out that the data was consistent with the 
results of regulators’ investigations, yet they find also signs of more widespread manip-
ulation (Snider & Youle, 2012). 
Gandhi et al. (Gandhi, Golez, Jackwerth, & Plazzi, 2013) study the relation of panel banks’ 
balance sheet exposure to Libor linked derivatives and individual submissions. Their hy-
pothesis is simply that banks whose gain from lower Libor, submit low rates. They find a 
significant relation between balance sheet exposure and Libor submissions (Gandhi, 
Golez, Jackwerth, & Plazzi, 2013).  
Their (Gandhi, Golez, Jackwerth, & Plazzi, 2013) study methods in more detail are fol-
lowing. First of all, they have end of month Libor exposure for different currency-ma-
turity pairs in Libor, which is measured via a multi factor model. The model is a function 
of changes in Libor, other control variables, and equity returns. They find that banks with 
particular exposure to Libor in one month, will submit accordingly in the following 
month. Other interesting findings they have are that the magnitude of that relation was 
biggest during years 2005-2009 and that banks which have already settled with regula-
tors, had strongest relation. Thus, results are remarkably consistent with the infor-
mation from legal investigations. The total estimated cumulative market value increase 
of banks due to manipulation is €22, 76 billion. (Gandhi, Golez, Jackwerth, & Plazzi, 2013)  
Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz, & Seow (2012) have, similar approach to test for manipu-
lation.  They do not test bunching around particular pivot levels, but instead, argue that 
“Libor quotes of ‘manipulative’ banks should group together in non-random patterns”. 
In other words, banks who cooperate with submissions, should have their submissions 
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correlated more than others. They find that during the first period (1/2007-8/2007) out 
of three, individual quotes are very alike and clustered together: most of the days the 
eight submissions which are left after trimming are from 9 banks. Vice versa, banks left 
out are often same. During the second (9/2007-4/2008) and third period (4/2008-
6/2008) the degree of clusterization is significantly lower, and therefore the hypothesis 
of no manipulation cannot be rejected. Authors underline that results only flag the pos-
sibility of manipulation, instead of proving it. (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012) 
Different, and with limited economic methods, approach is presented by Abrantes-Metz 
et al. (2011) who use old Benford law (Benford, 1938) for second digit distribution ref-
erence and compare it to actual rates. According to Benford law (1938) distribution of 
second digits in many natural set of number is not evenly distributed. Abrantes-Metz et 
al. (2011) find periods of time when 1 month dollar Libor second digit significantly devi-
ates from Bedford reference distribution. Benford law is used by Rauch, Goettsche and 
Mouaaouy (2013) in their study as well, which complements the methods used by 
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2011). They notify that Abrantes-Metz et al., (2011) use second 
digit distribution, without taking into account the fact that even first digit is not neces-
sary Benford distributed. Rauch et al. (2013) claim that before studying second digit dis-
tribution of Benfords law, the first digit must be confirmed to be Benford compliant. 
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2011) skipped that stage, and hence, may have fallacious results 
(Rauch, Goettsche, & Mouaaouy El, 2013). 
Rauch et al. (2013) have all currency-maturity pairs of Libor, Euribor, tabor and ISDAFIX 
rates included in their analysis, a total of 150 rates. Time span is 1999-2012. They com-
pare the distribution of rates to Benford law’s distribution, and do the same comparison 
to credit default swap spreads of respective banks. They find that, in general rates fit 
Benford law nicely in sterling, dollar and euro. However, rates in currency maturity pairs 
with lower underlying market volume, for example all rates in New Zealand dollar and 
Australian dollar, have the most significant deviation from Benfords distribution. Japa-
nese yen and Swizz franc are most deviated of the major currencies. Over time analysis 
shows that deviations were highest on pre 2008 period, when to their knowledge banks 
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stopped manipulating as a result of the excessive media attention the issue had at-
tracted. Rauch et al. (2013) conclude their results as follows: from 2002 to 2008 they 
find evidence of possible manipulation in reference rates. In addition, they find that not 
only the banks who have been under investigation, but also almost every other bank 
were part of the manipulation scandal. And besides to Euribor and Libor, also Tibor and 
some other rate submissions were suspicious. (Rauch, Goettsche, & Mouaaouy El, 2013) 
TABLE 3.1  SUMMARY OF BEHAVIOURAL BASED MANIPULATION STUDIES 
Study Methods Results Other Conclusions 
Chen (2013) Game theory 
model implies that 
Libor is biased 
downwards. 
Does not test 
against data 
Bias increases with 
credit risk 
Snider & Youle 
(2012) 
Banks Bid should 
cluster around piv-
otal levels 
Data supports their 
claims. Hence, ma-
nipulation. 
 
Abrantes-Metz et 
al. (2012) 
Cooperative banks 
submissions should 
cluster  
Find some evi-
dence, which can 
be caused by ma-
nipulation 
 
Gandhi et al. 
(2013) 
Balance sheet ex-
posure and Libor  
Balance sheet ex-
plains submission 
behaviour 
Banks have gained 
over 20 billion as a 
result of manipula-
tion 
Abrantes-Metz et 
al. (2011b) 
Benford’s law Find signs of ma-
nipulation 
 
Rauch et al.  (2013) Improved use of 
Benford’s law 
Find suspicious 
patterns especially 
in rates of smaller 
currencies 
Other than Libor and 
Euribor might have 
been subject to ma-
nipulation as well. 
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3.2 MARKET INDICATOR STUDIES  
Despite not being academic publication, the article series in Wall Street Journal 
(Mollenkamp, 2008; Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, 2008b) is, to my knowledge, a first 
attempt to quantify the current interest reference rate manipulation. In the study 
Mollenkamp & Whitehouse (2008) compared individual banks’ submissions to credit 
default swap spreads of respective banks together with risk free rate. They used the 
lowest panel bank submission as a proxy for risk free rate. They find that at least 5 of 16 
Libor panel banks were submitting lower rates than their actual inter bank funding is 
(Mollenkamp, 2008; Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, 2008b). WSJ article built the base for 
market based studies of Libor manipulations and had high media publicity.  
Probably the first academic studies where possibility of manipulation was noted were 
from Taylor and Williams (2008b). They conclude that after WSJ’s article the rates some-
what seemed to normalize. However, their main focus is not in manipulation but in ex-
plaining the in the US interbank markets. 
Abrantes-Metz, Kraten, Metz and Seow (2012) followed in 2012, though working paper 
was public couple of years before. In their study they use screening methods that have 
been used in many antitrust cases as evidence. They underline the fact that the screen-
ing methods do not prove manipulation, but “isolate outcomes that are improbable or 
anomalous”. They provide a hilarious example from 50’s: In conductor cable tender 
seven participants submitted sealed bids that all had exactly same figure in accuracy of 
eight digits ($198438.24). In that case it was very unlikely that all participants arrived 
into same result without any collusion. 
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012) have two test in which they compare Libor rates to other 
measures of interbank funding.  In the first test, they use the relation between Federal 
funds effective rate and different dollar Libors (over “clean” period 1990-2006) to pre-
dict Libor for suspected manipulation period (2007-2008). They find that actual Libor 
does not significantly differ from the predicted values, and hence, it does not indicate 
manipulation. In the second test, Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012) compare the banks’ Libor 
submissions rank, relative to others, to the rank of credit default swap spread relative 
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to others. The intuition behind is that if a bank has highest CDS spread, ceteris paribus, 
it should have the highest Libor submission as well. However, pattern is not found from 
the data in any of the three periods. What they find is that large banks have relatively 
high CDS rates given their borrowing costs. Reasons offered are: CDS spreads not ordinal 
indicator of borrowing cost, sample banks are unusual in unknown manner, or large 
banks have systemic risks in large banks CDSs is higher. One possible explanation given 
is volume discount large banks may have in the funding market. They also do analogical 
comparison against credit ratings of banks, and get similar results. Their final conclusion 
for the hypothesis related to credit risk is that the null hypothesis of no manipulation 
cannot be rejected. And as a result, they conclude that their findings flag for the possi-
bility of manipulation. (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012) 
Another study by Kuo, Skeie, & Vickery (2012) compares dollar Libor quotes to bank bid 
in Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility7 (TAF) and to Fedwire8 payments data. The for-
mer rate should be lower than Libor, because TAF borrowing requires collateral and is 
analogical to repo’s. Fedwire payments data is obtained via statistical algorithm which 
sorts interbank loans from the FED’s dollar real-time gross settlement payment system 
for banks. Hence, the algorithm may leave some loans out of count and count in some 
non-interbank unsecured loans, such as re-purchase agreements.  Their findings are fol-
lowing. First of all, in both cases Libor quotes are more clustered then the two other 
measures, and the difference is strengthened after market turbulence by Bear Sterns of 
Lehman Brothers.  The level of Libor quotes, especially after Lehman collapse, is lower 
than the level of TAF and Fedwire rates.  Kuo, Skeie, & Vickery (2012) do not claim that 
this is necessarily a result of manipulation, and could also be a result of other causes. 
Their main conclusion is that the Libor, particularly during market stress, is not optimal 
                                                     
7 Only auctions before 2008 when the total amount was fixed. http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetary-
policy/taf.htm: In TAF auctions FED allocated fixed amount of liquidity with variable rate, according to 
bids, to banking sector. Taf auctions were held on average every two weeks.  
8 Fedwire payments data is obtained via statistical algorithm which sorts interbank loans from the FED’s 
dollar real-time gross settlement payment system for banks. Hence, the algorithm may leave some loans 
out of count and count in some non-interbank unsecured loans, such as re-purchase agreements. 
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indicator of bank funding, and hence, it is not optimal reference in bank funding risks 
hedging. (Kuo, Skeie, & Vickery, 2012) 
Monticini & Thornton (2013) test the relationship of Libor to rates that reflect the de-
fault probability of banks, and test, if a significant change in relationship has occurred. 
The measure their compare dollar Libor with is certificate of deposit with equal term. 
During period of 1/2/2004 – 12/31/2010 they found three significant breaks in the rela-
tion. The two first brakes is caused by Libor movement downwards, as is assumed to 
happen due manipulation, and happened in June 14 2005 and August 9 2007 which is in 
line with the suspected starting period of manipulation in legal investigations. Further-
more, the third break was in upwards direction and offset the two previous ones. The 
respective date of recovering was 3rd December 2008 which is at the same time the issue 
was discussed in media. (Monticini & Thornton, 2013) 
Brousseau, Chailloux & Durré (2009) study the information content of money market 
fixings and not the manipulation in particular. They compare reference rate submission’s 
interest rate curve to the derivative market implied interest rate curve. The arbitrage 
should make these two measures to trade with a small spread. They find that after Leh-
man collapse arbitrage opportunities rise substantially.  They conclude that something 
unusual happened to reference rates and coordination between the submitters would 
be a good explanation for that. (Brousseau;Chailloux;& Durré, 2009) 
  
35 
 
TABLE 3.2  SUMMARY OF MARKET INDICATOR BASED MANIPULATION STUDIES  
Study Methods Results Other Conclusions 
Mollenkamp & 
Whitehouse, 
(2008) 
Comparison with 
CDS spreads 
Manipulation   
Taylor & Williams, 
(2008) 
Set market indica-
tors. Main purpose 
is not to study ma-
nipulation  
Raise doubts of ma-
nipulations 
 
Abrantes-Metz et 
al. (2012) 
Comparison to Fed 
Funds 
No manipulation  
Abrantes-Metz et 
al. (2012) 
CDS spreads Suspicious, but not 
clear 
CDS does not explain 
the Libor alone 
Kuo, Skeie, & 
Vickery (2012) 
Comparison with 
Fed Wire  
Clustered differ-
ently 
Libor not good indi-
cator during market 
stress 
Monticini & 
Thornton (2013) 
Comparison with 
certificate of de-
posits 
Manipulation. Sig-
nificant breaks in 
relation. 
 
Brousseau, 
Chailloux & Durré 
(2009) 
Comparison to ref-
erence rate deriva-
tives 
After Lehman rela-
tionship changed. 
Manipulation could 
be the explanation. 
 
 
3.3 DISCUSSION OF MANIPULATION STUDIES  
First of all, in general academic literature is suspicious about the rates. The main differ-
ences across the studies is in the degree of certainty. The market based studies mostly 
try to show the reputation driven manipulation as the measures have too a big error 
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component to show portfolio driven manipulation, which could be often only a deviation 
of few basis points from “normal” level. 
The forensic studies which use numerical Benford’s law are with the least interest in the 
scope of this thesis as the valuation of the method requires more knowledge of statisti-
cal methods than economics. Though, both studies by Abrantes-Metz et al. (2011b) and 
Rauch et al. (2013) found strong evidence for manipulative behaviour also in rates that 
have not been subject to allegation. However, my criticism towards these studies is that 
if the underlying markets activity of reference rate declines, a submitting bank by defi-
nition, has to still report according to the best knowledge of what hypothetical market 
rates would be. Hence, the non-existence of markets can cause the reference rate fix-
ings’ digits to deviate from Benfords’ natural distribution, but still the behaviour of banks 
is compliant with the rules. CDS’s markets, to which they compare, does not suffer from 
the same. Their findings that smaller markets have stronger evidence for manipulation 
support my claims. 
In market measure studies Monticini and Thornton (2013) are the most explicit with 
their structural break findings. In contrary, Kuo et. Al (2012) agree with the possibility of 
manipulation, yet they conclude that Libor is not a good indicator during market stress 
and many factors other than manipulation could have also caused the deviation in the 
measured used. Similar results are found by Gyntelberg & Wooldridge (2008) who con-
sider the liquidity worries more dominant driver of fixings than credit concerns. Kuo and 
Skeie (2013) argue that the lack of taking into account the liquidity premiums is common 
questionable feature of manipulation studies. 
The value of market indicator studies in the first place was to flag for the possibility of 
manipulation, before the regulators stepped in and investigated banks more thoroughly. 
Regulators were able to access information which was not available for scholars. Never-
theless, the apparent benefit of academic studies post-manipulation period is the ability 
to build measures or even meters that could be used to trigger any further investigations 
from regulators or be part of the regulators’ tool kit in supervision. In the current context 
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these method can be used to study rates after the crisis, or banks who has not been 
charged yet I.e. grounds which are still unexplored.  
In addition to showing manipulation, literature is able to contribute something to the 
incentive side as well.  For example, Chen (2013) shows that the strategic bidding as-
sumption (with some other assumptions) causes Libor bias that grows larger with the 
“true” rates. In the same spirit Snider and Youle (2012) find that rates cluster around 
some key levels, which is caused by the trimmed mean mechanism in rate calculation. 
These findings speak for the need of supervision and regulation in the rate setting pro-
cess. 
After the banks have been charged of manipulation, the obvious question to be asked 
is, if the rates are now valid? In the next chapter I do my bit and study one of the interest 
rates with unused methods, though inspired by the WSJ (Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, 
2008) article. In theory the knowing of the period of manipulation should give a perspec-
tive of what a manipulation looks like. In practice, the financial crisis during the manip-
ulation period makes the conditions unthankful to set up a “laboratory” experiment. 
Therefore it is hard to observe how manipulative act would alter the relationship of ref-
erence rates and given market rate.  
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4 MARKET DATA ANALYSIS  
In the empirical part I will employ “no-arbitrage condition” by comparing Libor rates to 
the price of buying protection from credit default. This approach is not directly possible 
for Euribor rates as those rates does not have to, by definition, present submitting 
banks’ own costs of interbank unsecured funding. Strictly speaking, I will study the long 
run relationship between credit risk spreads implied by 12 month euro Libor rates and 
credit default swaps. If markets are functioning and have had time to adjust, these 
should be equal. If they are not, manipulation is one possible explanation. 
One might ask, why I am using CDS markets instead of other short term securities. Is it 
not so that some money market short term instruments offer almost perfect substitutes 
for interbank transactions? As was discussed in the first chapter, euro short term money 
market instruments are often illiquid and the data is not available. On the contrary, CDS 
market offer a liquid and continuous market indicator of credit risk of a particular bank 
for given maturity. 
4.1 RELEVANT MARKET INSTRUMENTS  
4.1.1   CR EDI T DEFAULT  SW APS  
Vanilla Credit default swap is an agreement between two parties, where one party 
agrees to pay fixed stream of cash in exchange for protection of principal amount in case 
the reference entity fails to pay the principal. From now on for convenience, I will refer 
these parties as protection buyer and protection seller. Market convention is to quote 
CDS contracts prices as basis points over the principal amount. The price is often re-
ferred as a CDS spread. For example, CDS spread of 100 basis points means that protec-
tion buyer pays 1 % premium of the principal annually. Only in a case of credit event, 
like default of the reference entity, the CDS seller is liable for the loss default causes in 
the principal amount. (Bomfim, 2005) 
Most used CDS contracts are single name contracts, which means that the referred en-
tity is, for example a specific company. CDS contracts also vary with respect to the sen-
iority of reference debt and the applied legal framework. The maturities of CDS contracts 
vary, but the most common are 3, 5 and 10 years. The premium payment convention is 
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most often on quarterly basis. International Swap and Derivatives Association has de-
fined different types of credit events, which trigger the liability of protection seller: 
bankruptcy, obligation acceleration, failure to pay, repudiation (reference entity chal-
lenges the validity of its debt obligation), and unfavourable restructuring to creditors. 
(Bomfim, 2005, pp. 67-82) 
In the case of a credit event, two conventions on how protection seller can settle its 
obligation are common. First one is so called physical delivery. In physical delivery the 
protection seller is obliged to buy the bond subject to credit event for its nominal price 
from the protection buyer. In cash settlement the protection seller pays the difference 
between recovery value and face value. Standard way to determine the recovery value 
is to auction reference debt subject to credit event. (Bomfim, 2005, pp. 67-82) 
 
FIGURE 4.1  CDS OVERVIEW (SOURCE:  ECB,  2009) 
In practice CDS contracts are used in risk control, but they also make it possible to posi-
tion with reference entity’s credit risk, without directly owning its debt. Since initially no 
principal changes owner, with a particular amount of capital, one can use CDS contracts 
to get exposure to a bigger amount of credit risk than by owning debt directly. The pro-
tection seller has a long position in company’s debt, which is analogical to buying the 
company’s bonds. Hence, when short selling of other’s debt is not possible, CDS con-
tracts can be used to achieve short position. (Bomfim, 2005, pp. 67-82) 
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It is obvious that the CDS spread is determined based on the likeliness of credit event 
and the recovery rate. The valuation of credit risk for debt and derivative markets is 
often done using structural models or reduced-form models (De Wit, 2006). Former val-
ues firms’ debt via the implicit default option it is holding whereas latter models takes 
default as exogenous events, which in turn, can be modelled with jump processes (De 
Wit, 2006). However, the details of CDS valuation are not in the main scope of this thesis, 
as I am interested in my approach of the pricing differences of the risk in the two mar-
kets, not the true risk. Yet, calculating out the default probability from the CDS and in-
terbank market could be one approach to my problem as well. 
CDS market size has been growing substantially in the 2000s (ECB, 2009). According to 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Assosciation (ISDA, 2013) the conventional 
measure for market activity used to be notional value of CDS contracts. However port-
folio compression, which terminates contracts instead of entering into an offsetting one, 
has reduced the notional amount. If this effect is taken into account the market have 
maintained it size and activity in past couple of years (ISDA, 2013). Nevertheless, I will 
control the CDS market liquidity in my analysis. 
The recent discussion about CDS misleading price information and destabilising market 
effects is interesting, but it should not have an effect on the validity of my methods. 
Portes suggests (2012) the some entity’s CDS prices changes may lead to the change of 
that entity’s cost of funding, which is a kind of twisted causality and price discovery, and 
a potential source of market instability. However, this does not change the arbitrage 
condition between the two variables, and hence, it should not be a driver for arbitrage 
condition violation. 
4.1.2  OV ERNI GHT  IN DEX ED SWAP S  (OIS) 
OIS derivative contract is an interest rate swap derivative (Todd, 2006). In OIS derivative 
contracts one party agrees to pay fixed rate against the average of variable overnight 
rates (in euros it is Eonia) over the agreed period and notional amount. As the net ex-
pected value of contracts must be zero at the moment when it is agreed, it must be that 
the fixed rate represents the expectations of average overnight rates for the given pe-
riod (Sengupta & Tam, 2008). As Eonia is basically the shortest possible interest rate, 
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and the counterparty risk component involved is considered trivial (Sengupta & Tam, 
2008). Also in OIS contract itself the credit risk is considered nearly non-existent, as no 
principal changes owner. In addition, no initial cash is needed, thus funding risk is mini-
mal. Altogether, OIS illustrates the market expectations of geometric average of short-
est possible rate over given period, and it contains no term premium. (Todd, 2006) 
In practice OIS can be used, for example, to hedge against the variation in overnight 
rates. This is relatively easy to illustrate when the contract participant is able to invest 
its principal with Eonia rate. This has been illustrated in figure 4.2, in which it is shown 
how investor A invests some principal overnight and earns Eonia rate. At the same time 
investor A enters into an OIS contract, which has the same nominal amount as the prin-
cipal amount invested. Now the Eonia rate is effectively passed to investor B, who in 
return pays the fixed rate that was agreed in the beginning. In practice, instead of set-
tling the cash flows every day, cash flows are counted as compounded rate and settled 
in the end of the contract. The illustration does not take into account the funding costs 
Investor A has for the principal amount. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2  STYLIZED CASH FLOWS OF OIS 
In addition to its technical properties, the OIS market is considered liquid and efficient, 
which makes it suitable as a risk free indicator. In addition to my thesis, the OIS rate is 
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also used widely in different money market and interbank studies as a proxy for risk free 
rate. See e.g. Gefang et al. (2011), Sengupta & Tam (2008), and Kuo et al. (2012).  
4.1 THEORY OF ARBITRAGE CONDITION  
In the definition of Libor it is required that banks report their own funding costs. Hence 
the Libor rate and submitter credit risk should have a direct link. Credit risk is the risk 
investors require against possible payments problems of debtor. Credit risk embedded 
in Libor is noted especially the academic literature branch, which studies the different 
risks components of Libor rates (aggregate, not the individual rates) during the crisis9. 
The common feature of these articles is that they use CDS spread as a proxy for credit 
risk. This approach assumes that Libors’ credit spread and CDS are correlated. Unfortu-
nately, this is not necessarily the case, when manipulation o taken into account. By stud-
ying individual banks’ submissions I can account each bank with market priced CDS 
spread and compare that to the Libor submissions. I consider the Libor submission some-
what same as a zero coupon bond. 
The differences of CDS and interbank implied risk spread are much less discussed in ac-
ademics than CDS and bond implied risk spread. The latter is recognized in literature as 
CDS Bond basis. For examples, see De Wit (2006) and Zhu (2006). In a similar manner, 
for the sake of clarity, I use the term CDS-Libor basis to denote the difference of Libor 
implied risk and CDS spread. To my best knowledge, that term has not been used in 
academic literature to date.  
CDS and interbank rates arbitrage condition is discussed in paper by Eisenschmid & 
Tapking (2008). Otherwise similar direct arbitrage analysis is scarce in academic litera-
ture. Eisenschmid & Tapking (2008) use repurchase agreement rate (repo rate) as a risk 
free interest rate. They show that (2008, pp. 15-16) arbitrage condition is simply as is 
described in equation 1, given CDS premium payment(ρ), interbank rate (c) and repo 
rate (r). 
                                                     
9 For example Smith (2012), Taylor & Williams (2008a,b),and Michaud & Upper (2008),  
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 ρ = 𝑐 − 𝑟 (4.1) 
And if it does not hold, I define that as CDS-Libor basis as follows: 
ρ − (𝑐 − 𝑟) = 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 (4.2) 
 
The main difference between their analysis and mine is that in my model I use OIS as an 
indicator of risk free rate. From arbitrage point of view, the risk free rate is the rate 
which is also assumed to be the funding rate of the arbitrager, as banks need cash to 
exploit the opportunity. I will illustrate the arbitrage possibilities when the basis is non-
zero. Similar but more technical illustration is also in the paper by Eisenschmid & Tapking 
(2008). 
When some banks B CDS spread is lower than the Libor implied risk spread (negative 
basis):  
Lending bank A could lend money for bank B at some rate (c). Bank A needs to cash to 
finance the lending  (amount X). Bank A can borrow at rate r by rolling the debt overnight 
and locking the overall interest rate by entering into an OIS contract. At the end of the 
loan period this arrangements yields (c − r) ∗  X, if the entity has not defaulted. To pro-
tect from the default, bank A enters into a CDS deal, which in case of default, compen-
sates any losses of the principal amount (this and other assumptions are discussed in 
the next subsection). In case the credit event happens, bank loses nothing. If the credit 
event does not happen, bank A earns (c – r – ρ) ∗  X. Hence, it looks like that this profit 
is earned without risk of losing capital. 
CDS spread is higher than Libor implied risk spread (positive basis): 
Bank A writes CDS protection over bank B and gets premium (ρ ∗  X) at the end of the 
loan period. If bank B defaults, bank A will lose the amount X. If bank A loans the money 
to Bank B, it will get ((c – r) x X < ρ). However, in case of default, bank will lose its capital 
(X). Bank A will clearly rather write the CDS which yields more than lend money to bank 
B. Hence, under perfect markets, the described situation should not happen. In this case 
any assumptions of the funding rate of lender does not have to be made, as regardless 
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of its rate (r), the CDS is will always be better option. Unlike in bonds, third party cannot 
short sell bank B’s debt, which is in a form of interbank deposit.  However, Libor allows 
that short-term instruments, like certificate of deposits, are used as a base for rate sub-
missions. Those CD’s can be, at least in theory, sold short.  
The above illustrations shows that the condition 1 should hold as in the long run arbi-
tragers will exploit the pure profit possibilities. However, the CDS-bond basis literature 
offers plenty of explanations why there can be deviation from the arbitrage condition 
and why it is not necessarily zero.  
4.1.1  THE CDS-L I BOR  BASI S   
The exactly same condition as in equation 1 is found with CDSs and bonds (Zhu, 2006), 
which allows me to exploit the methods used in CDS-bond basis studies quite straight-
forwardly. CDS-bond basis studies are useful as the academic literature about interbank 
unsecured rates and CDSs is scarce in quantity. The arbitrage condition does not take 
into account the drivers which can cause the basis to be non-zero, at least in the short 
term, but also in the longer term. The CDS Bond basis has been reviewed extensively for 
example by (Hull, Predescu, & White, 2004, p. 10; De Wit, 2006, pp. 3-12; Zhu, 2006, p. 
215; Bühler & Trapp, 2009; Bomfim, 2005). I have listed below the factors that can be 
generalized to affect at the interbank markets. I have also shortly discussed how these 
measures are controlled in my thesis, or why they are left out. The discussion of the 
modelling is in the subsection 4.2. 
I. Funding liquidity risk. One does not need cash to enter into a CDS contract. 
Hence, the ability to raise funds can constraint arbitrage possibilities in the inter-
bank deposits. Negative bond basis may exists if lenders are cash constrained i.e. 
have high rate of refunding. (De Wit, 2006) In terms of arbitrage, using OIS as risk 
free rate assumes that banks can get funding at OIS rate, which is same as as-
suming that bank is able to roll its debt overnight for given period. Because this 
is never certain, as market conditions and banks’ ability to get funding can 
change, risk premium over OIS is required. Often Libor-OIS itself is used as a 
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proxy for funding risk premium. However, for obvious reasons, this is not possi-
ble when I am particularly studying the validity of Libor. The market wide liquidity 
proxy is discussed in more detail in subsection 4.3.  
II. Risk of basis. There is a risk that basis exploiter bank needs to terminate the deal 
prematurely. This could be due to funding needs. If the basis has widened mean-
while, the investor is subject to losses. This factor is hard to measure (De Wit, 
2006), but the risk is related to the funding risk: when funding risk is high, locking 
into basis deals does is not desirable. Hence, the effect is negative, put I assume 
it is taken into account in funding risk component. 
III. The “hidden” cheapest to deliver option in CDS contracts: The better the option, 
the higher must the CDS spread be (Bomfim, 2005, pp. 78-79). Bomfim (2005, p. 
79) argues that the value of the option has diminished in recent years.  
IV. Counterparty risk of CDS: In case of default of reference entity, is the protection 
seller able to pay the liabilities (Bomfim, 2005, pp. 78-79)? CDS spread must be 
lower to compensate for this: why would one pay full insurance fee, if there was 
a possibility that the insurance does not cover the expenses? Counter party risk 
of CDS protection seller is discussed in detail in Hull & White (2001) and in De 
Wit (2006). However, the effect is relatively small, and as the issuers are mostly 
same companies, this effect should be market wide (Hull & White, 2001; De Wit, 
2006; Bomfim, 2005).  
V. Mismatches in the accrued cash flows of interbank and CDS market: CDS con-
vention is quarterly paid premium whereas interbank deposits pay coupon at the 
end of period. CDS protection seller is only liable of the loss in face value. Coupon 
payments are excluded. (Bomfim, 2005, pp. 78-79)  Provided the credit event 
does not happen, accrued CDS premium could be matched to equal the bond 
credit spread and there would be no mismatch. However, the bigger is the prob-
ability of credit event, the bigger is the possibility that one ends in the latter sce-
nario where the payoffs differ significantly, because CDS protection seller gets 
the accrued premiums, ceteris paribus, CDS writer is better off, and hence annu-
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alized premium should be smaller than bond credit spread. This effect is endog-
enous to credit risk. (Bomfim, 2005, pp. 78-79) Nevertheless, I have not taken 
this into account as, even with high credit spreads, this effect is relatively small. 
VI. The liquidity premiums of CDS markets and (Bomfim, 2005, pp. 78-79) 
And money market (Bomfim, 2005, pp. 78-79). As I later argue, this factor is con-
sidered to be most significant factor in driving basis. By market liquidity premium 
I refer to the cost of liquidating assets. There is no universally agreed proxy for 
market liquidity. Common ones are market bid-ask spread, market turnover, and 
amount of price quotations for certain time period. I will use relative bid-offer 
spread for CDS markets. Money market liquidity premium is embedded in the 
proxy of the non-default component. 
VII. Tax and other regulatory differences are hard to quantify and the effect can be 
in any direction. (Hull, Predescu, & White, 2004, p. 11)  
VIII. Transaction costs allow for small arbitrage possibilities to exit (De Wit, 2006) 
IX. Portfolio driven manipulation. As Libor submitter can have incentives to manip-
ulate in any direction, it can make the basis to be positive or negative. However, 
these effects are small, as the portfolio driven manipulation was often only cou-
ple of basis points. 
X. Reputation driven manipulation. This causes the basis to be positive as Libor has 
lower credit risk implied component than CDS contracts. Hence, high and persis-
tently positive basis is suspicious. 
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TABLE 4.1  BASIS FACTORS  
Factor Impact on Basis 
Funding liquidity risk -  
Risk of basis - 
Cheapest to deliver option + 
Counterparty risk of CDS issuer - 
Mismatches in cash flows +  
Liquidity premium of CDS markets + 
Liquidity premium of interbank mar-
kets 
- 
Tax and regulatory differences +/- 
Transaction costs +/-  
Portfolio driven manipulation +/- 
Reputation driven manipulation + 
 
4.2 HOW TO MODEL THE LIBOR-CDS  BASIS? 
The review of CDS-bond basis literature in subsection 4.1.1 have offered plenty of rea-
sons why the CDS-bond basis does not necessarily have to be zero. The effects are clearly 
time specific and company specific. However, many studies have found that for most 
companies the bond-basis in the long run is close to zero (Zhu, 2006; De Wit, 2006), 
which is verified by co-integration analysis, and also without any role given to the factors 
listed in table 4.1. Zhu for example finds that price discrepancy correction is about 10 % 
a day and it normally exists for 2-3 weeks. Zhu (2006), Fontana (2011), and Bai & Collin-
Dufresne (2011) state that during normal times, the basis is mainly small positive and 
there is always idiosyncratic variation. These pre-crisis studies indicate that I could make 
the assumption that the above mentioned effects do not play significant role, at least 
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not in the long run. It is tempting to make this assumption, because even getting up with 
a proxy for most of the factors is challenging.  
In studies which try to decompose aggregate Libor-OIS spread into components the 
spread is often seen as a sum of non-default factors and default factors, though the 
interaction between them is also regonized.  Michaud & Upper (2008) and Eisenschmid 
& Tapking  (2008) claim that especially the liquidity risk spreads have been dominant 
drivers of unsecured interbank markets during the financial crisis. Taylor and Williams 
(2008a,b) attribute more on the credit risk. Smith (2012) see both in approximately 
equal role. Ji (2012) sums that the literature shows evidence in both directions. How-
ever, Ji (2012)  himself finds evidence that creditworthiness in in smaller role. 
The above literature implies that negative CDS-Libor basis could be negative at least 
during the 2007-2008, as the liquidity premium of money markets is higher, ceteris pa-
ribus. At least bond-basis is found to have been mostly negative (persistently) during the 
crisis (Fontana, 2011).  Bai, Collin and Dufresne (2011) find that funding risk, counter-
party risk and collateral quality were main reasons for negative basis during the crisis. 
Hence, the CDS-bond basis literature and money market literature indicate that in the 
financial crisis market environment at least the liquidity factors should be considered. 
The other factors should be relatively constant over time or the effect can be regarded 
small. 
All in all, theory clearly points out that in the long run Libor-OIS difference to CDS-spread 
(the CDS-Libor basis) should be stationary, and likely close to zero. There can be short-
run deviation, of which I am not interested in. However, if the basis is non-stationary for 
a period, which can be considered long enough to not to be regarded as a short run 
variation, it is possible that some non-default factor of CDS or Libor-OIS spread is causing 
it. Hence, persistently low or high basis, i.e. deviation from the long run equilibrium, can 
be observed, even without it being caused by the manipulation.  
The biggest problem in my approach to Libor manipulation is that there is no obvious 
measures for the non-default components. My choices are described and justified in the 
next subsection.  
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4.3 DATA DESCRIPTION  
The data used consists of daily time series beginning from 2004 until the end of 2013. 
The comprehensive descriptive statistics can be found from Appendix 1. The Libor rate 
reviewed is 12 month euro rate. Twelve month euro rate is not the most referred rate 
of Libor panel, but it allows to use one year CDS spreads without the problematic ma-
turity mismatch. Shorter than one year CDS spreads were limitedly available for the 
banks. I have data access to Libor submissions and CDS quotes for 11 panel banks out of 
15 (Abbey National bank had relatively few CDS quotes, so I decided to drop it out). 
Individual Libor submissions of panel banks are public. CDS data and OIS data is from 
Bloomberg. For each instrument the daily market close value is used. 
CDS bid and offer quotes used are for unsecured senior single name contracts. The cur-
rency and technical legal features of contracts are identical for all of the banks, and thus, 
they do not explain any variation. The CDS spread used in analysis is actually the mid 
spread, which is the average of bid and offer prices on a given moment of time. The CDS 
market liquidity proxy is the CDS bid-offer spread divided with the mid spread. This 
spread to price ratio is less correlated with the CDS spread than the plain bid-offer 
spread. The high correlation with CDS spread would be very problematic, because like-
liness of manipulation is also likely to be positively correlated with CDS spread (higher is 
the credit risk, the higher is the need to manipulate). Hence, it could have been possible 
that banks manipulating had been accounted for with a high coefficient of CDS liquidity, 
but in reality, it was the credit risk component of liquidity proxy that explained the var-
iation. The weakness of the spread to price ratio is that it may overestimate the liquidity 
conditions when CDS spread is high. To illustrate this: bid offer spread of a one basis 
point with CDS mid-price of ten basis points gets equal value as spread of hundred basis 
points with CDS mid-price of thousand basis points. Yet, it seems obvious that in the 
latter case the market liquidity is lower. 
To capture the non-default element of Libor-OIS spreads, I will use Euribor-OIS spread 
for 12 month Euribor. This choice of proxy has two flaws: it is not banks specific and it 
has a credit component (of a prime bank). However, the credit component should be 
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relatively fixed over time, as the hypothetical prime bank which the Euribor is quoted 
for, should be considered to have excellent credit profile. The Euribor-OIS proxy cap-
tures only the variation of the market wide non-default component. Company specific 
data is not available in required frequency, and the structural methods with interpola-
tion would complicate the analysis and be out of the scope of this thesis.  
Data is divided into three periods. The periods are pre-crisis period (4/01/2003 - 
7/19/2007), period of manipulation (7/20/2007-12/31/2008), and post-manipulation 
period (1/01/2009 - 12/13/2013). The start and end dates for period two are obtained 
from Monticini and Thornton (2013). Periods 1-3 include together 2794 dates of obser-
vations. Period one has 1123, period two 379, and period three 1292. Comprehensive 
descriptive statistics of each variables for each period can be found in appendix 1. 
4.4 METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS  
Important concept in time series analysis is the stationarity of a series. A time series is 
said to be (weakly) stationary if the mean and the covariance between arbitrary lags are 
not time dependent. In practice times series should be such that the values vary in a 
constant way around its constant mean. (Tsay, 2002, p. 23)  
First I will test the all the series for unit root, to see if they are non-stationary. This is 
done with Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. For each bank appropriate amount of 
lags is determined by Schwarz information criterion (SIC)10.  The regression tested for 
series x is presented by equation 4.3. In the equation p is the number of lags determined 
by SIC. Null hypothesis is that series contains a unit root, which means that in the equa-
tion coefficient 𝛼 gets value zero. Critical values are obtained from simulation results of 
MacKinnon (1996)11, as the test statistics do not follow any standard tabulated distribu-
tion. 
                                                     
10 Information criteria, like SIC, demonstrate how small the squared errors are compared to the amount 
of parameters. The smaller the better. Eviews uses modified version of standard SIC (Brooks, 2008, pp. 
232, 236)  
11 This is the standard of Eviews statistical program 
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𝛥𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝛥𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡 
𝑝
𝑖=1
 4.3. 
For non-stationary series the long term relationships is studied by using co-integration 
analysis as is proposed by Engle & Granger (1987).  Series are said to be co-integrated if 
they are non-stationary but a linear combination of the series is stationary (Engle & 
Granger, 1987). My two series are CDS credit spread and Libor-OIS (c-r) for each bank. 
According to previous section of this thesis, the theory proposes that in the  long run in 
equation 2 the basis is close to 0, which implies that the linear combination vector is (1,-
1). Hence equation 3 coefficients get values 𝛼 = 0  and 𝛽 = 1.  
ρ𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑐𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡) +𝜀𝑡 
4.4. 
To test for co-integration, I simply test if the error term (here it is equal to the basis) is 
stationary for each bank. To test if there has been changes, I test for the unit root sepa-
rately for the three different periods. If unit root test statistic is lower than the critical 
value for given confidence level the null-hypothesis of unit root can be rejected, and it 
follows that the series can be said to be co-integrated. Similar residual based co-integra-
tion analysis for CDS-bond basis is conducted by De Wit (2006). In addition to predeter-
mined co-integration vector, I use fully modified ordinary least square method (FMOLS 
is the standard estimation method of co-integration in Eviews computer program) to 
estimate the parameters, and then test the residual for stationarity. This is called Engel-
Granger two step method. 
According to Gregory & Hansen (1996, pp. 102-103) dummy variables can be included 
in the co-integration analysis. The process is relatively straightforward when the timing 
of structural breaks are known. With dummy variables, one can allow for level shift, 
trend shift and regime shift in co-integrated process. The idea is that even though co-
integration is considered to represent long-term relationship of non-stationary varia-
bles, it is possible that during the review period series are not co-integrated but during 
the sub-periods series are co-integrated (1996, pp. 102-103). This is likely case if manip-
ulation has happened as it would most likely cause a different mean for different peri-
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ods. Applying Gregory & Hansen (1996, p. 103) I would classify that as a level shift. Ma-
nipulation could also cause a regime sift in the model. This effects can be modelled by 
adding dummy variables to interact with beta coefficient. I include three dummy di var-
iables in the equation to allow for structural change. For period i di gets value 1 and for 
other periods it gets value 0. I estimate beta –terms in the following equation by using 
FMOLS:  
ρ𝑡 = ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝛽1𝑖
3
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑑𝑗
3
𝑗=1 𝛽2𝑖(𝑐𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡) +𝜀𝑡 
4.6. 
In the third co-integration estimation the liquidity variables of CDS for each bank and 
market wide money markets liquidity variable are included. I will use the theory implied 
coefficient for the term (𝑐𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡) as I did in the equation. This is equal as estimating the 
FMOLS (discussion of FMOLS in the end of this subsection) for  
ρ𝑡 − (𝑐𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡) = + ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝛽1𝑗𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐶𝐷𝑆
3
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝛽2𝑗
3
𝑗=1
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝑡 4.7. 
And for clarity  
ρ𝑡 − (𝑐𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡) = 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 
4.8. 
For both of the equations 6 and 7 I will run a unit root test to see if the residuals are 
stationary, and thus, the series co-integrated. 
The reputation driven manipulation story proposes that banks did not want to separate 
themselves from other banks with their Libor submissions. Hence, it implies that Libor 
submissions of banks should be co-integrated together. To test for this, I test for co-
integration relationship between banks and the final Libor rate, which is the trimmed 
average all submissions.  If banks are contributing honestly, we should find banks having 
persistently high (low) CDS to submit higher (lower) Libors and hence, the series of those 
banks should not be co-integrated. 
As was mentioned above, I will use FMOLS methods to estimate the co-integration co-
efficients. According to Eviews 7 User’s Guide (Quantitative Micro Software, 2010, p. 
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220) ordinary OLS estimations is not recommended as its results are non-Gaussian, as-
ymptotic biased, and asymmetric. In OLS analysis the interference of co-integration co-
efficients is not feasible. FMOLS method fixes the long run correlation problem between 
the co-integrating equation and stochastic regressors. This is done via semi-parametric 
bias correction. (Quantitative Micro Software, 2010, p. 223). 
4.5 RESULTS  
The non-stationary tests for variables are included in appendix 2. The results show that 
the Libor-OIS spread and CDS-spread are non-stationary for all of the 11 banks. Averages 
of CDS-Libor basis, Libor-OIS, and CDS spreads are listed in table 4.2. Basis of banks are 
drawn in figure 4.3 and also individually in appendix 3. For number of the banks the 
period two included a time span when no CDS-data was not available. Thus, figure 4.3 
has a gap in the middle. 
TABLE 4.2  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Average Basis (%)   Average CDS (%)   Average Libor(%) – OIS(%)  
 Period Period Period 
Bank 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 1-3 1 2 3 
Barclays 0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.49 0.07 0.96 0.72 
Citibank 0.5 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.1 1.0 1.6 0.47 0.07 0.94 0.69 
Credit 
Suisse 
-0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.53 0.06 0.99 0.80 
Deutsche 
Bank 
-0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.50 0.06 0.94 0.75 
HSBC -0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.46 0.07 0.94 0.66 
JP Morgan -0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.46 0.07 0.92 0.65 
Lloyds 0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.49 0.07 0.94 0.73 
Rabo -0.1 0.0 -0.9 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.50 0.06 0.95 0.67 
RBS 0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.7 1.3 0.51 0.08 0.95 0.75 
Societe 
Generale 
0.3 0.0 -0.7 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.6 1.2 0.52 0.09 0.93 0.68 
UBS 0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.48 0.07 0.92 0.70 
Variance 
of means 
0.05 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 
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FIGURE 4.3  BANKS CDS-L IBOR BASIS (%) 
Average basis of panel banks was very low until the June of 2007 when financial market 
turbulence begun. During that time the average CDS and LIBOR-OIS spread was also rel-
atively flat. In period two (7/2007-12/2008) the basis plunged almost for all of the banks. 
In the third period the basis has been mainly positive for most of the banks. The variation 
of Libor-OIS spread is low in each of the periods, whereas the variation of CDS and basis 
is higher in 2nd and 3rd period. 
In the table 4.3 are the results of the null-hypothesis of no co-integration as is defined 
in equation 4.3. The test is done for each period together and individually. The table 4.3 
shows that for the period 2 only one bank passes the co-integration test at 1 % confi-
dence level. Test for all periods 1-3 shows that 3 banks pass the co-integration test at 1 
% level, 8 at 5 % level, and one at 10% level. To sum up, 9 banks pass the test at least at 
10% level. Results as is shown in table 4.2 and 4.3 are in align with the discussion in 
subsection 4.2 of this thesis, which indicated that during the period 2 basis could be 
persistently negative. Negative basis and non-stationarity could be caused by the liquid-
ity factors, not necessarily the manipulation. Moreover, the basis should be positive in 
case the reputation driven manipulation is the only factor driving the basis. The test for 
first period is omitted as the CDS and LIBOR-OIS series were stationary during that pe-
riod. 
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TABLE 4.3  CO- INTEGRATION TEST RESULTS WITH (1,-1) CO- INTEGRATING VECTOR  
Bank/Period 2 3 1-3 
Barclays No Yes *** Yes *** 
Citibank No No No 
Credit Suisse No Yes ** Yes ** 
Deutsche Bank No Yes *** Yes *** 
HSBC No Yes ** Yes ** 
JP Morgan No Yes ** Yes ** 
Lloyds No Yes ** Yes ** 
Rabo No No No 
RBS Yes *** Yes ** Yes *** 
Societe Generale No Yes ** Yes ** 
UBS No No Yes * 
The null of no-cointegration is rejected at level    *<0.10 **<0.05 ***<0.01 
 
TABLE 4.4  ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND CO- INTEGRATION TEST  
  Beta   Constant Co-integration 
over period 1-
3 
Observa-
tions 
Bank/Period 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Barclays 0.4 -0.6 0.7 0.2 5.4 0.2 Yes*** 2167 
Citibank 0.5 -1.2 1.3 0.5 8.9 0.2 No 2415 
Credit Suisse 0.5 -0.6 0.7 0.2 5.6 0.0 Yes*** 2102 
Deutsche Bank 0.3 -0.5 0.6 0.3 4.6 0.1 Yes*** 2310 
HSBC 0.2 -0.4 0.5 0.2 3.6 0.1 Yes*** 1969 
JP Morgan 0.2 -0.3 0.4 0.3 2.7 0.2 Yes*** 2302 
Lloyds 1.6 -1.8 1.8 0.0 15.5 -0.2 Yes*** 1700 
Rabo 0.0 -0.1 0.5 1.0 2.4 0.1 No 1570 
RBS 0.4 -0.8 0.9 0.5 6.5 0.3 Yes** 2145 
Societe Gene-
rale 
-1.2 1.3 1.6 6.8 0.9 0.0 Yes*** 1629 
UBS 0.3 -0.7 0.8 0.3 5.8 0.0 Yes* 2230 
The null of no-cointegration is rejected at level    *<0.10 **<0.05 ***<0.01      
 
Table 4.4 contains the results of equation 4.6 which allowed for trend and regime shifts 
in the estimation. Now the p-values of co-integration test improve and with 7 banks the 
null hypothesis can be rejected at 1 % level. However, the beta-coefficient, which should 
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in light of theory be close to 1, changes its sign with almost all of the banks in second 
period. Also the constant term, gets very large values - especially in period 2. 
The unit root test reveals (appendix 2) that the co-integration equation as is in 4.8, can-
not be estimated for the first and third period as the CDS liquidity series are stationary 
for all of the banks. Hence, I estimate it only for the period two. Results of co-integration 
test, in which market wide non-default factor and individual CDS-liquidity factor are in-
cluded, are presented in table 4.5. Results show that only three banks out of 11 pass the 
test. All of them pass also with the highest significance level. Besides, the sign of esti-
mated MM-liquidity factor for each bank is the same and it has the theory implied neg-
ative sign (see subsections 4.1 and 4.2 of this thesis). The CDS Liquidity factor got very 
small values for all of the banks, and the MM liquidity factor, was co-integrated and 
barely changed when the estimation was done without the CDS-liquidity proxy. In addi-
tion, CDS factor alone was not co-integrated with the basis. Hence CDS liquidity is de-
noted as 0 for each of the three banks. 
TABLE 4.5  CO- INTEGRATION OF BASIS , CDS LIQUIDITY.  MONEY MARKET LIQUIDITY IN PERIOD 2 
  
Barclays Citibank Credit 
Suisse 
Deutsche 
Bank 
HSBC JP     
Morgan 
Lloyds Rabo RBS Societe 
Generale 
UBS 
Period 2  
co-integration  No No No No No Yes***  No Yes*** Yes*** No No 
            
CDS Liquidity 
      0  0 0   
            
Money Mar-
ket Liquidity  
      -0.47  -0.66 -0.31   
            
Observations 129 210 130 133 109 191 31 51 126 77 194 
The null of no-cointegration is rejected at level  *<0.10 **<0.05 ***<0.01 
 
 
 
I will also repeat the test for banks which had the basis non-stationary in the period 3. I 
have omitted the CDS-liquidity variable, as it was stationary during the period for all of 
the three banks. Table 4.6. Shows that the market wide money market liquidity proxy is 
not able to explain the non-stationarity of those three banks in period 3. This was highly 
57 
 
expected as it would have been likely that then also the other banks would have had a 
non-stationary basis during the period 3 – exactly like they had in period 2. 
TABLE 4.6  CO-INTEGRATION OF BASIS AND MONEY MARKET LIQUIDITY IN PERIOD 3 
  
Citibank Rabo UBS 
Period 3  
co-integration  No No No 
    
    
Money Mar-
ket Liquidity  
    
    
Observations 2036 1091 1078 
The null of no-cointegration is rejected at significance level: 
   *<0.10 **<0.05 ***<0.01      
     
Table 4.7 shows the results of Libor and individual banks Libor submissions co-integra-
tion test. The table shows interestingly how in period one all the banks had very highly 
significant co-integration with the Libor rate. In periods two and three only three and 
two banks respectively do not pass the co-integration test. 
TABLE 4.7  CO- INTEGRATION TEST RESULTS OF LIBOR AND INDIVIDUAL LIBOR SUBMISSIONS 
Bank/Period 1 2 3 
Barclays Yes*** Yes *** Yes *** 
Citibank Yes *** Yes ** Yes *** 
Credit Suisse Yes *** No Yes ** 
Deutsche Bank Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** 
HSBC Yes *** Yes *** No 
JP Morgan Yes *** No Yes ** 
Lloyds Yes *** No Yes ** 
Rabo Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** 
RBS Yes *** Yes *** Yes ** 
Societe Generale Yes *** Yes ** Yes *** 
UBS Yes *** Yes * No 
The null of no-cointegration is rejected at significance level: *<0.10 **<0.05 ***<0.01 
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4.6 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
In figure 4.4 is plotted (Y-axis) the average CDS-spread and (X-axis) the average CDS-
Libor basis of each bank. In figure 4.4 the Y-axis is changed to Libor-OIS spread. A trend 
line (OLS) is drawn for each period’s dots to illustrate the relationship between the two 
variables. The numbers are from the table 4.2. The figure 4.4 illustrates that a high CDS-
spread average is associated with a high basis average. Whereas the opposite does not 
hold for Libor-OIS spread: the trend lines in figure 4.5 are relatively flat.  
These result indicate that the Libor-OIS spread for individual bank poorly takes into ac-
count the credit risk implied by the CDS spread. The variation of Libor-OIS spreads aver-
ages is not either similar with the variation of CDS spreads in period 2 or 3, as they are 
totally different in size. Even this simple comparison of basic descriptive statistics raises 
questions about Libor submissions validity from counterparty risk perspective. 
 
FIGURE 4.4  AVERAGE BASIS (%)  AND CDS SPREAD (%) 
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FIGURE 4.5  AVERAGE BASIS (%)   AND LIBOR-OIS (%) 
The (1,-1) co-integration test results in table 4.6 reveal that the process somewhat 
changed during the period 2 as only one of the banks pass the co-integration test. In 
that period the basis turned negative for almost all of the banks. The general negative 
basis observed in period 2 is in line with other studies of CDS bond basis and also of the 
money market component studies discussed in subsection 4.1. Those studies accounted 
the rose of Libor-OIS spread to be caused by the growth in funding risk and liquidity 
premium, and to lesser extent of credit risk. Thus, negative basis does not solely prove 
that a bank is not manipulating.  
Similar conclusions can be made based on the results (table 4.4) of the co-integration 
test of period specific coefficients and constants (dummy variables). In the first period 
co-efficient vary very much. This could be because the CDS spreads are so small (average 
for all of the banks is less than 0,10 %) that the LIBOR-OIS spread does not incorporate 
practically any credit risk. In period two the estimated coefficients turn into negative, 
which seem to be against theory, but is actually explained by omitted variable: the 
money market non-default component. However, the period 3 variation is not explained 
by the money market nor the CDS market non-default component, and hence, especially 
bigger coefficients than 1 seem suspicious. 
Adding the market wide money market non-default component proxy in to the model 
explained the deviation from the long run equilibrium only for three banks. Besides, as 
the liquidity factor coefficient was estimated separately for every bank, it should have 
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captured to some extent also company specific drivers, which vary together with the 
market wide factor. Hence, the failure to pass the test, can be accounted for company 
specific factors that are not correlated with the market specific factors, one of which, is 
the intentionally low submitting. Unfortunately, due to the extraordinary environment 
during the financial crisis, the results from period 2 should be interpreted with extra 
caution. Also the lack of observations over the period two can cause some incoherent 
features in the test. Therefore the results of banks with small number of observations in 
period 2 (Lloyds for example who does not pass the test and Rabo who does) should not 
be interpreted as strong evidence in any direction.  
The co-integration test of Libor and individual banks’ submissions (table 4.7) indicates 
that the submissions are moving together with Libor. Interestingly enough, banks which 
failed the co-integration test were among those who had also the lowest CDS spread i.e. 
the credit risk. This could be explained by the trimmed average mechanism of Libor cal-
culation, as was discussed in the subsection 4.4. The lowest 25 % (and highest) of sub-
missions do not directly affect the level of Libor as they are trimmed away. Hence, if 
some banks are constantly trimmed away (like banks with the lowest credit risk should, 
ceteris paribus, be the ones with lowest Libor submission) they are not necessarily co-
integrated with the actual Libor. Furthermore, we could observe similar behaviour also 
in the high end of the Libor submissions. In other words, banks which have persistently 
high CDS and submit, ceteris paribus, accordingly persistently high Libor, should be per-
sistently among submissions that are trimmed away, and thus, do not necessarily have 
to be co-integrated with the actual Libor. However, this is not the case at all. Only in the 
third period HSBC is among the banks with highest CDS and fails the co-integration test. 
These results are evidence for the case that banks submissions are closely in the other, 
and are not affected by the CDS rates, at least not in the high end (of CDS rates). 
I have formed a table (4.8), in which the above results are combined. The first row de-
scribes the individual test. It is important to note that the test are not independent of 
each other and the ”weight as evidence” of the tests are not necessarily equal. Hence, 
the table should be regarded mainly as an illustration and wrap up of tests done. 
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Table 4.8 clearly illustrates that some banks failed the tests more often than others. The 
consistent failure of tests is suspicious. These results suggests, that banks were submit-
ting lower than actual rates in period two, but also in period 3. Hence, the reputational 
manipulation part of scandal seems to be more widespread than what is suggested by 
the fact that only Barclays is caught of submitting lower than actual rates. The evidence 
is especially strong in the case of Citibank. 
Even though the manipulation was discussed in public already in the end of 2008, the 
highest basis are observed after that (in the early 2009, see figure 4.3 and appendix 3). 
For example, the highest individual basis of observation period is of Citibank’s in 
4/02/2009 when the basis was 8.51 %! On that date Citibank submitted 1.77 % Libor 
submission while markets priced maturity matched protection from its credit risk at 9.4 
%. Thus it seems unlikely that Citibank answered according to its best knowledge to the 
Libor question “what is the rate it would get (unsecured) funding if it was asked to do 
so”. Citibank has also failed all of the co-integration tests. 
TABLE 4.8  SUMMARY OF TESTS  
Test Positive basis 
Fails (1,-1) 
co-integra-
tion test 
Fails esti-
mated Co-
integration, 
or beta-co-
efficient > 1 
Fails co-inte-
gration test 
with non-
default fac-
tors 
High CDS  
together 
with co-in-
tegration 
between 
own submis-
sions and Li-
bor 
Bank/ Applies for 
periods 
3 1-3 3 2 2-3 
Citibank x x x x x 
Lloyds x   x x x (period 3) 
Societe Generale x   x x x 
Barclays x     x x 
UBS   x (period 3)   x x (period 2) 
Rabo   x x     
RBS x       x 
Credit Suisse       x   
Deutsche Bank       x   
HSBC       x   
JP Morgan 
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To sum up the results: the descriptive statistic imply that banks with higher CDS rates 
have higher basis. Banks in the top CDS range are also the ones which fail most co-inte-
gration. These results speaks for the fact that banks were reporting unrealistic funding 
rates. The individual bank submission analysis was carried out by testing multiple differ-
ent co-integration tests. I will not try to quantify the amount of manipulation. Instead of 
that, I conclude that we have JP Morgan in the one end, passing all the tests, and Citi-
bank in the other end, who fails all the tests. Drawing a line between manipulative bank 
and honest bank is difficult to justify. However, Barclays which we know is guilty of ma-
nipulation, is only in the mid class, and therefore, it seems likely that manipulation was 
more widespread than what can be considered based on investigations carried by au-
thorities. In addition, the table 4.1 shows that banks individual submissions, even with 
the banks with high credit risk, are mutually co-integrated.  
The biggest challenges of my analysis were to find relevant proxies for the non-default 
elements of CDS and Libor-OIS spreads. First of all, the CDS market liquidity proxy was 
not significant in any test carried out. However, I find it unlikely that the liquidity factor 
is totally spurious, but it could be that it underestimates the true positive basis. How-
ever, I doubt this could explain as big basis as was observed for many banks. 
The possible factors presented in table 4.1 that are not included (as the impact was con-
sidered small and fixed), were implying both positive and negative basis. Hence, it is hard 
to assess the possible outcome the factors would have, if those could be taken into ac-
count. Thus I have to assume their effects are fixed and relatively small as I argued. This 
assumption is least likely to hold for the counterparty risk of CDS protection seller, given 
the high overall credit risk on the markets. The counterparty risk of CDS issuer has neg-
ative effect on the basis, which would imply even more manipulation. Counterparty risk 
is very hard to control as the credit risk of protection sellers is most likely correlated with 
the manipulation.  
The money market non-default element Euribor-OIS spread has at least two deficits: it 
only captures the market wide variation and has credit risk element embedded as well. 
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However, I argue that these are not very serious flaws. First, the market wide variation 
should correlate strongly with the individual variation to large extent, and second, the 
credit risk element only makes it easier for banks to pass the co-integration tests. 
Another criticism towards the results is that unit root test could be weak. That means 
that I reject unit root, which exists, or other way around. One way to tackle this would 
be confirmatory analysis (Brooks, 2008) in which, unit roots tests are supplemented with 
stationarity tests. I did some tentative analysis and the results were in line. However, I 
have not included them in to this thesis as it would complex the presentation of results.  
Furthermore, having multiple tests (table 4.8) showing coherent evidence speaks for the 
robustness of the tests. 
The results are obtained for one year Libor euro, which is far less followed and referred 
rate than, for example, 3 month USD Libor. However, this should only make the signal-
ling incentive of Euro Libor submissions less significant. Hence, it seems unlikely that in 
more active rates the manipulation was less severe, given that there are banks which 
have incentive to manipulate. 
To get supporting evidence for my results, further studies could repeat the empirical 
analysis to other currencies and maturities. Also, improving the existing and adding 
more basis factors could be path worth of walking. In addition, studying the CDS-basis 
of short term securities could reveal something that is not found in CDS-bond basis stud-
ies. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS  
Interbank reference rates Libor and Euribor are important financial institutions.  Unfor-
tunately, the declining activity in the underlying unsecured interbank markets have risen 
the question of their validity and representativeness subject to suspicion. Market devel-
opments have led to a situation, in which hundreds of billions of contracts in nominal 
value are tied in to rates, of which underlying market does not exist. In addition to the 
representativeness validity issues, the rates have been subject to manipulation. 
As was discussed in chapter 2, the manipulation happened in two forms. Measured in 
official allegations, the more widespread was the portfolio driven manipulation. In that 
form the panel banks’ submitted rates that increased the profits of banks’ derivative 
investments. The other form of manipulation was reputation driven, and officially, it has 
only been related to Barclays’ Libor submissions. The incentive to reputation driven ma-
nipulation was to avoid negative media publicity. 
The lawsuits carried by the regulators are still ongoing. The fact that Barclays was the 
only one found guilty of submitting lower than actual rates, was contradictory to the 
general opinion and to some degree even with academic studies. The academic studies 
related to the manipulation, in general, found evidence of manipulation - the difference 
of the studies was mostly in the degree of certainty that the manipulation was concluded 
to have happened. Most of the studies were carried out before the authorities’ investi-
gations became public. Thus they lack the luxury of knowing the results from the inves-
tigations. 
I approached the Libor validity by studying the co-integration of CDS and Libor-OIS 
spreads of the Euro Libor panel banks in 2003-2013. The co-integration analysis captures 
the long-run relationship of the two measures. Due to this, only the reputational type of 
manipulation could be captured as the portfolio driven manipulation did not last longer 
than one day at a time. It also explains why JP Morgan was able to pass all the tests, 
despite the fact that it is one of the banks that has been found guilty of portfolio driven 
manipulation. 
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My empiric results contributes in the ongoing discussion of Libor validity and manipula-
tion investigations in couple of ways. First, I found evidence that the manipulation was 
more widespread than what it considered by the regulators in the period of manipula-
tion (start of 2007 until the end of 2008). Second, the submitted rates of some banks 
have been unrealistic even after the manipulation period (2009-). This was especially 
true for banks with high credit risk.  
My results are in line with the previous academic studies to the extent the comparison 
is meaningful. By not meaningful, I refer to the fact that other studies did not point out, 
excluding non-academic WSJ article (Mollenkamp &Whitehouse, 2008), specific banks. 
Also the time period studied was different. First of all, in this thesis and in the academic 
studies in general evidence of manipulation was found. Second, some scholars found 
interestingly similar results as I did. For example, Snider and Youle (2012) concluded that 
manipulation was widespread and happened longer than has been initially suspected. 
They have arrived to same results as I have, but with different method. Metz-Abrantes 
et al. (2011) conclude that the order of banks’ CDS rates is not good predictor of the 
order of Libor submissions. Again, something I found. The game theory framework by 
Chen (2013) proposes that there is a “Libor bias”, which grows when the dispersion of 
“true rates” increases. Libor bias means that the Libor is always lower than the actual 
Libor, because the banks in the high end submit too low rates. I got evidence that sup-
ports this theory, as the banks with high CDS seemed to be the ones who were manipu-
lating. However, this might be a pure coincidence:  even a simple incentive to submit 
rate close to other submissions could yield similar results as the Chen’s (2013) game 
theory framework. Thus, I argue that to get further support for the Chen’s (2013) theory, 
more specific tests against data should be conducted. 
The WSJ article (Mollenkamp &Whitehouse, 2008) deserves few thoughts, as the meth-
ods inspired mine. Mollenkamp & Whitehouse (2008) have some of the same names in 
the list of suspects as I have, one of those is the Citigroup, which failed all my co-inte-
gration tests. The direct comparison of numbers is not feasible as the study was done to 
USD Libor and mine is to euro, thus the panel banks are different. However, one inter-
esting fact is that JP Morgan is in the WSJ’s list of suspects, but in my analysis JP Morgan 
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passed all the tests. This could be due to the fact that WSJ’s analysis was done only on 
snapshot basis, and it did not allow for possible short term deviation nor liquidity effects. 
Those effects were allowed in my co-integration testing. Though it cannot be excluded 
that the dollar Libor could have different co-integration test results. 
The discussion of reference rate reform is ongoing and many of the recommendations 
given in Wheatley’s and EBA-ESMA recommendations are implemented already. One 
often suggested silver bullet to fix the rates is the transaction based reference rate sys-
tem. This system has some drawbacks of which not the least is, as was discussed in chap-
ter 1, the lack of transactions. This problem is true especially during periods of market 
stress.  
Thus, as Wheatley’s report (2012b) and many other reports hint, it is likely that expert 
judgment will always be part of the reference rates calculation. Against this fact, my 
methods and results can be applied to contribute to the reform as well. First of all, my 
analysis reveals that the Libor system did not function properly during the turbulent 
market environment beginning in 2007, which was possibly because of the reputation 
fears. Hence, the implemented delaying of individual rate submissions publication is jus-
tified. However, this does not necessarily remove the incentive totally. To further ad-
dress this problem, the empirical tools I employed in this thesis could be used as a back 
testing tool. Even without controlling the non-default components of Libor-OIS and CDS 
spread, the concept of CDS-Libor basis is useful as a simple stress barometer of Libor 
quality: high absolute level of the basis could trigger authorities to conduct further in-
vestigations. Furthermore, if in the future we have a menu of different reference rates, 
an idea present in BIS report (2013, p. 16), my methods could be employed in quality 
control of all the reference rates that contain credit risk. 
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APPENDIX 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Bank + number of the period 
CDS ASK                
 BARCLAYS1 BARCLAYS2 BARCLAYS3 
CITI-
BANK1 
CITI-
BANK2 
CITI-
BANK3 CREDIT_SUISSE1 CREDIT_SUISSE2 CREDIT_SUISSE3 DEUTSCHE_BANK1 DEUTSCHE_BANK2 DEUTSCHE_BANK3 HSBC1 HSBC2 HSBC3 
 Mean 0.05 0.78 0.88 0.09 1.07 1.72 0.08 0.57 0.75 0.08 0.57 0.69 0.07 0.48 0.52 
 Median 0.05 0.63 0.71 0.08 0.72 1.27 0.07 0.30 0.60 0.06 0.43 0.53 0.07 0.37 0.41 
 Maximum 0.24 2.13 2.63 0.20 5.52 9.42 0.33 1.97 2.84 8.49 1.51 2.55 0.27 1.08 1.87 
 Minimum 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 
 Std. Dev. 0.02 0.61 0.54 0.04 1.05 1.82 0.02 0.53 0.50 0.29 0.41 0.45 0.03 0.31 0.36 
 Skewness 2.89 0.70 1.03 1.06 1.33 2.23 3.16 1.43 1.37 28.88 0.74 0.82 1.24 0.77 1.35 
 Kurtosis 20.32 2.16 3.31 2.79 4.32 7.98 24.74 3.93 5.05 846.00 2.31 2.94 6.74 2.26 4.63 
                
 Jarque-Bera 10106.14 19.29 231.78 191.19 99.12 2185.81 16960.28 61.31 572.76 25911808.00 20.41 145.32 452.27 20.78 534.28 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
 Sum 36.28 135.37 1134.68 93.03 288.00 2015.49 62.53 92.39 877.72 68.15 104.82 881.04 35.04 81.23 669.42 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.38 63.14 374.12 1.34 295.66 3867.71 0.45 45.41 294.51 71.71 31.21 265.28 0.57 15.89 166.46 
                
 Observations 728.00 173.00 1290.00 1006.00 270.00 1175.00 794.00 163.00 1171.00 871.00 185.00 1283.00 538.00 171.00 1284.00 
 
CDS ASK                   
 
JP_MOR-
GAN1 
JP_MOR-
GAN2 
JP_MOR-
GAN3 LLOYDS1 LLOYDS2 LLOYDS3 RABO1 RABO2 RABO3 RBS1 RBS2 RBS3 
SO-
CIETE_GEN-
ERALE1 
SO-
CIETE_GEN-
ERALE2 
SO-
CIETE_GEN-
ERALE3 UBS1 UBS2 UBS3 
 Mean 0.12 0.48 0.59 0.05 0.09 1.31 0.05 0.55 0.59 0.06 0.75 1.31 0.08 0.61 1.21 0.05 0.76 0.92 
 Median 0.10 0.35 0.44 0.05 0.09 1.23 0.05 0.39 0.49 0.07 0.56 1.23 0.08 0.54 0.88 0.04 0.61 0.69 
 Maximum 0.30 1.80 2.68 0.20 0.12 3.19 0.07 1.62 2.24 0.24 2.92 3.45 0.21 1.26 4.47 0.23 2.30 4.02 
 Minimum 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.21 0.03 0.07 0.06 
 Std. Dev. 0.05 0.36 0.44 0.02 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.37 0.41 0.02 0.59 0.75 0.02 0.29 0.90 0.02 0.63 0.71 
 Skewness 1.21 0.84 1.97 1.49 -0.82 0.48 -0.80 1.50 1.94 0.93 1.31 0.54 0.39 0.54 1.43 3.67 0.80 1.74 
 Kurtosis 3.50 2.89 7.55 9.48 3.11 2.56 3.15 5.23 6.83 9.88 4.76 2.58 4.25 2.85 4.08 30.01 2.49 6.68 
                   
 Jarque-Bera 236.52 27.84 1772.85 1510.51 3.84 45.83 43.28 53.19 1416.12 1470.72 76.35 72.45 58.13 5.48 443.01 29237.62 26.04 1216.01 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                   
 Sum 106.59 114.11 687.07 34.35 3.08 1275.15 20.22 49.94 671.43 44.36 136.60 1693.99 50.17 67.23 1385.30 42.58 168.76 1047.33 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2.73 30.20 231.69 0.32 0.01 498.69 0.01 12.20 188.97 0.38 63.69 725.14 0.35 9.09 918.53 0.24 86.83 569.80 
                   
 Observations 925.00 236.00 1174.00 713.00 34.00 971.00 400.00 91.00 1146.00 695.00 183.00 1291.00 644.00 111.00 1144.00 896.00 222.00 1138.00 
 
                  
                   
                   
                   
 
 
CDS BID                
 BARCLAYS1 BARCLAYS2 BARCLAYS3 
CITI-
BANK1 
CITI-
BANK2 
CITI-
BANK3 CREDIT_SUISSE1 CREDIT_SUISSE2 CREDIT_SUISSE3 DEUTSCHE_BANK1 DEUTSCHE_BANK2 DEUTSCHE_BANK3 HSBC1 HSBC2 HSBC3 
 Mean 0.03 0.68 0.80 0.05 0.94 1.56 0.04 0.50 0.67 0.04 0.49 0.62 0.04 0.35 0.46 
 Median 0.02 0.59 0.64 0.05 0.60 1.12 0.04 0.25 0.52 0.03 0.38 0.47 0.03 0.31 0.36 
 Maximum 0.21 1.96 2.44 0.12 5.13 8.90 0.22 1.79 2.64 8.45 1.37 2.38 0.19 0.96 1.71 
 Minimum 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 
 Std. Dev. 0.02 0.54 0.50 0.02 0.95 1.72 0.02 0.49 0.47 0.29 0.38 0.43 0.03 0.25 0.33 
 Skewness 5.17 0.80 0.99 1.34 1.35 2.25 3.19 1.41 1.38 29.32 0.83 0.83 1.89 1.12 1.31 
 Kurtosis 42.87 2.43 3.20 5.26 4.48 8.01 20.57 3.90 5.09 863.60 2.49 2.96 10.02 3.35 4.48 
                
 Jarque-Bera 51457.91 22.72 211.87 514.93 105.37 2176.64 11559.86 59.22 588.63 27003394.00 22.99 145.62 1423.94 33.57 487.12 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
 Sum 18.89 127.66 1034.32 53.09 248.92 1797.81 30.95 81.11 789.84 33.98 89.73 792.43 19.39 54.72 596.93 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.25 55.04 326.39 0.33 241.27 3409.78 0.46 39.22 255.05 70.99 26.74 233.51 0.39 9.40 143.35 
                
 Observations 728.00 189.00 1288.00 1006.00 266.00 1153.00 794.00 163.00 1176.00 871.00 185.00 1272.00 538.00 156.00 1286.00 
 
CDS BID                   
 
JP_MOR-
GAN1 
JP_MOR-
GAN2 
JP_MOR-
GAN3 LLOYDS1 LLOYDS2 LLOYDS3 RABO1 RABO2 RABO3 RBS1 RBS2 RBS3 
SOCIETE_GENER-
ALE1 
SOCIETE_GENER-
ALE2 
SOCIETE_GENER-
ALE3 UBS1 UBS2 UBS3 
 Mean 0.08 0.41 0.50 0.02 0.06 1.22 0.02 0.43 0.52 0.03 0.66 1.22 0.03 0.51 1.10 0.02 0.69 0.84 
 Median 0.07 0.29 0.36 0.02 0.06 1.15 0.02 0.33 0.42 0.03 0.50 1.16 0.03 0.48 0.80 0.02 0.55 0.62 
 Maximum 0.23 1.26 2.42 0.11 0.11 3.02 0.04 1.46 2.04 0.17 2.62 3.25 0.18 1.12 4.10 0.15 2.01 3.78 
 Minimum 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.03 
 Std. Dev. 0.03 0.32 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.34 0.37 0.02 0.54 0.71 0.01 0.28 0.83 0.02 0.59 0.66 
 Skewness 1.46 0.68 1.97 0.86 -0.24 0.48 -0.36 1.55 1.96 2.95 1.28 0.54 3.97 0.32 1.42 3.26 0.77 1.79 
 Kurtosis 5.51 2.32 7.64 4.24 3.28 2.56 2.31 5.31 6.90 23.19 4.61 2.59 36.65 2.55 4.07 24.12 2.41 6.96 
                   
 Jarque-Bera 614.29 23.25 1807.39 132.26 0.51 45.77 16.69 73.66 1454.20 12806.43 70.00 72.25 32065.02 3.45 438.92 18241.42 25.11 1339.23 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                   
 Sum 76.24 99.44 585.29 17.14 2.54 1190.44 9.26 51.00 593.03 22.56 120.72 1571.76 20.66 67.84 1262.58 16.56 152.25 942.61 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1.18 24.30 193.65 0.16 0.02 456.19 0.02 13.90 159.36 0.22 53.88 646.30 0.13 10.21 790.17 0.24 77.22 490.45 
                   
 Observations 992.00 241.00 1171.00 707.00 40.00 975.00 400.00 118.00 1144.00 695.00 183.00 1291.00 644.00 134.00 1145.00 896.00 222.00 1128.00 
 
                  
                   
                   
                   
 
  
 
 
Libor                
 
BAR-
CLAYS1 
BAR-
CLAYS2 
BAR-
CLAYS3 
CITI-
BANK1 
CITI-
BANK2 
CITI-
BANK3 CREDIT_SUISSE1 CREDIT_SUISSE2 CREDIT_SUISSE3 DEUTSCHE_BANK1 DEUTSCHE_BANK2 DEUTSCHE_BANK3 HSBC1 HSBC2 HSBC3 
 Mean 2.81 4.79 1.31 2.81 4.77 1.28 2.80 4.82 1.38 2.80 4.77 1.34 2.81 4.77 1.25 
 Median 2.37 4.76 1.31 2.37 4.72 1.28 2.37 4.75 1.40 2.37 4.73 1.33 2.38 4.73 1.26 
 Maximum 4.61 5.54 3.03 4.60 5.55 3.02 4.59 5.65 3.20 4.59 5.50 3.20 4.60 5.53 3.00 
 Minimum 1.92 3.06 0.37 1.91 3.04 0.38 1.91 3.20 0.40 1.91 3.22 0.45 1.92 3.03 0.35 
 Std. Dev. 0.76 0.49 0.60 0.77 0.50 0.58 0.76 0.48 0.62 0.76 0.47 0.56 0.76 0.50 0.59 
 Skewness 0.93 -0.93 -0.01 0.92 -0.83 0.00 0.92 -0.52 -0.03 0.93 -0.85 0.05 0.93 -0.89 0.09 
 Kurtosis 2.38 4.56 2.07 2.37 4.34 2.17 2.38 3.69 2.22 2.39 4.33 2.37 2.38 4.49 2.13 
                
 Jarque-Bera 175.28 90.71 46.25 174.62 70.17 36.30 174.86 24.15 32.41 176.11 71.62 21.70 175.15 83.81 42.04 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
 Sum 3097.29 1782.26 1665.20 3097.08 1774.38 1623.37 3089.73 1793.17 1760.47 3087.13 1775.39 1701.86 3093.98 1775.87 1585.98 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 644.87 90.11 464.18 649.17 93.60 428.85 641.01 84.60 482.41 640.44 82.06 404.56 641.29 92.04 439.87 
                
 Observations 1103.00 372.00 1272.00 1103.00 372.00 1272.00 1102.00 372.00 1272.00 1102.00 372.00 1271.00 1102.00 372.00 1272.00 
 
Libor                   
 
JP_MOR-
GAN1 
JP_MOR-
GAN2 
JP_MOR-
GAN3 
LLOYDS
1 
LLOYDS
2 
LLOYDS
3 RABO1 RABO2 RABO3 RBS1 RBS2 RBS3 
SOCIETE_GENER-
ALE1 
SOCIETE_GENER-
ALE2 
SOCIETE_GENER-
ALE3 UBS1 UBS2 UBS3 
 Mean 2.81 4.76 1.23 2.81 4.77 1.31 2.97 4.78 1.26 2.82 4.79 1.33 3.01 4.76 1.27 2.81 4.75 1.29 
 Median 2.38 4.72 1.25 2.37 4.74 1.33 2.69 4.73 1.26 2.39 4.74 1.39 2.74 4.74 1.26 2.38 4.67 1.31 
 Maximum 4.58 5.48 2.97 4.60 5.51 3.01 4.57 5.53 3.03 4.61 5.53 3.03 4.61 5.60 2.87 4.59 5.52 3.05 
 Minimum 1.94 2.99 0.27 1.93 3.00 0.34 1.97 3.09 0.37 1.94 3.06 0.38 2.05 2.90 0.35 1.93 3.08 0.46 
 Std. Dev. 0.76 0.50 0.61 0.76 0.51 0.60 0.78 0.49 0.58 0.76 0.49 0.61 0.78 0.53 0.58 0.76 0.50 0.53 
 Skewness 0.92 -0.97 -0.08 0.93 -1.00 -0.10 0.57 -0.84 0.02 0.93 -0.87 -0.09 0.56 -0.98 -0.04 0.93 -0.71 0.18 
 Kurtosis 2.36 4.68 2.11 2.38 4.62 2.08 1.82 4.47 2.27 2.39 4.44 2.06 1.82 4.61 2.02 2.38 4.06 2.41 
                   
 Jarque-Bera 173.68 101.58 43.64 176.00 102.99 46.50 94.81 77.14 28.18 176.13 78.57 48.24 92.77 100.05 51.02 175.44 48.33 24.92 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                   
 Sum 3102.12 1769.54 1570.37 3095.49 1774.19 1671.92 
2521.6
2 
1777.1
2 
1601.4
2 
3105.3
7 
1780.2
4 
1695.1
2 2525.36 1772.02 1615.39 
3093.0
0 
1768.7
4 
1636.4
2 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 638.20 91.56 468.02 643.10 97.77 454.62 517.09 88.00 423.14 640.13 89.44 470.10 505.49 103.78 425.62 639.00 92.92 356.23 
                   
 Observa-
tions 1103.00 372.00 1272.00 1102.00 372.00 1272.00 849.00 372.00 
1272.0
0 
1103.0
0 372.00 
1272.0
0 839.00 372.00 1272.00 
1101.0
0 372.00 
1270.0
0 
OIS and EURI-
BOR       
 
OIS1 OIS2 OIS3 EURIBOR1 EURIBOR2 EURIBOR3 
 
 
 Mean 2.74 3.82 0.59 2.81 4.78 1.33 
 Median 2.31 4.10 0.62 2.38 4.73 1.32 
 Maximum 4.53 4.67 1.68 4.59 5.53 3.03 
 Minimum 1.83 1.54 -0.01 1.93 3.05 0.47 
 Std. Dev. 0.77 0.77 0.42 0.76 0.50 0.57 
 Skewness 0.92 -1.70 0.58 0.93 -0.87 0.05 
 Kurtosis 2.37 4.88 2.61 2.39 4.43 2.14 
       
 Jarque-Bera 175.65 237.29 79.45 176.15 78.54 39.95 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
 Sum 3070.90 1448.81 756.09 3096.99 1773.01 1693.14 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 656.71 223.69 231.25 640.49 90.85 408.47 
       
 Observations 1121.00 379.00 1292.00 1103.00 371.00 1272.00 
 
CDS-LIBOR Basis               
                
 BARCLAYS1 
BAR-
CLAYS2 
BAR-
CLAYS3 
CITI-
BANK1 
CITI-
BANK2 
CITI-
BANK3 CREDIT_SUISSE1 CREDIT_SUISSE2 CREDIT_SUISSE3 DEUTSCHE_BANK1 DEUTSCHE_BANK2 DEUTSCHE_BANK3 HSBC1 HSBC2 HSBC3 
 Mean -0.02 -0.33 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.99 0.02 -0.45 -0.09 0.00 -0.51 -0.07 0.00 -0.63 -0.14 
 Median -0.02 -0.32 0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.42 0.01 -0.37 -0.12 0.00 -0.41 -0.11 -0.01 -0.55 -0.15 
 Maximum 0.19 0.43 1.43 0.21 3.28 8.51 0.28 0.33 1.52 0.16 0.04 1.11 0.22 0.11 0.83 
 Minimum -0.11 -1.46 -0.70 -0.09 -0.68 -0.58 -0.07 -1.64 -0.85 -0.09 -1.51 -0.69 -0.08 -1.69 -0.91 
 Std. Dev. 0.03 0.38 0.34 0.04 0.62 1.69 0.03 0.44 0.32 0.04 0.39 0.26 0.04 0.43 0.25 
 Skewness 1.51 -0.85 1.24 1.04 1.59 2.43 2.05 -0.98 1.52 0.86 -1.00 1.01 1.09 -0.65 0.73 
 Kurtosis 9.29 3.88 5.07 3.91 5.78 8.74 14.80 3.35 7.55 4.02 3.08 4.77 5.97 2.85 5.01 
                
 Jarque-Bera 1473.65 26.00 553.46 212.60 197.01 2726.82 5128.72 26.55 1438.14 143.32 30.33 378.67 302.87 11.95 323.54 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                
 Sum -13.91 -55.74 200.74 23.66 37.63 1141.31 13.40 -73.23 -106.77 3.19 -93.04 -82.28 -2.46 -106.89 -176.66 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 0.68 24.68 145.29 1.81 101.27 3317.99 0.74 30.50 118.96 1.15 27.29 83.15 0.80 30.67 76.25 
                
 Observations 726.00 171.00 1270.00 994.00 265.00 1156.00 789.00 161.00 1152.00 865.00 183.00 1262.00 536.00 169.00 1264.00 
  
 
 
CDS-LIBOR Basis                  
                   
 
JP_MOR-
GAN1 
JP_MOR-
GAN2 
JP_MOR-
GAN3 LLOYDS1 LLOYDS2 LLOYDS3 RABO1 RABO2 RABO3 RBS1 RBS2 RBS3 
SOCIETE_GENER-
ALE1 
SOCIETE_GENER-
ALE2 
SOCIETE_GENER-
ALE3 UBS1 UBS2 UBS3 
 Mean 0.04 -0.45 -0.10 -0.02 -0.28 0.56 -0.02 -0.85 -0.14 -0.01 -0.34 0.57 -0.03 -0.67 0.49 -0.02 -0.29 0.18 
 Median 0.02 -0.37 -0.12 -0.03 -0.41 0.53 -0.02 -0.69 -0.16 -0.01 -0.33 0.50 -0.03 -0.56 0.23 -0.02 -0.28 0.05 
 Maximum 0.28 0.56 1.75 0.15 0.05 1.81 0.09 0.12 1.17 0.17 1.00 1.81 0.14 -0.17 3.08 0.15 0.63 2.91 
 Minimum -0.09 -1.57 -0.85 -0.10 -0.58 -0.30 -0.11 -1.82 -0.97 -0.10 -1.35 -0.43 -0.11 -1.84 -0.39 -0.16 -1.19 -0.67 
 Std. Dev. 0.05 0.39 0.40 0.03 0.23 0.42 0.03 0.47 0.35 0.03 0.40 0.46 0.03 0.40 0.62 0.03 0.35 0.54 
 Skewness 1.16 -1.34 1.52 1.10 0.19 0.25 0.48 -0.39 0.93 0.72 -0.17 0.35 1.02 -1.19 1.49 1.06 -0.31 2.36 
 Kurtosis 3.84 4.63 7.33 6.23 1.22 2.58 4.35 2.44 5.09 6.24 4.22 2.32 7.24 3.36 4.32 9.74 3.97 9.79 
                   
 Jarque-Bera 233.30 94.27 1346.00 449.83 4.68 16.73 41.57 3.01 366.95 362.74 12.13 50.38 363.11 26.47 498.04 1851.92 12.14 3188.38 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                   
 Sum 38.21 -104.43 -119.67 -15.27 -9.39 536.94 -6.38 -66.49 -154.15 -9.21 -61.75 723.57 -9.92 -73.57 548.96 -20.40 -62.70 199.30 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 2.65 35.06 180.81 0.64 1.70 165.34 0.26 16.83 137.30 0.68 29.03 264.81 0.32 17.22 433.71 0.61 27.03 330.11 
                   
 Observa-
tions 916.00 231.00 1155.00 710.00 34.00 956.00 365.00 78.00 1127.00 693.00 181.00 1271.00 394.00 109.00 1126.00 890.00 220.00 1120.00 
  
APPENDIX 2: Unit root tests 
Unit root tests 
CDS MID MAXLAG=2  ADF test statistic p-value 
Bank \ Period 1 2 3 1-3 
barclays 0.00 0.88 0.12 0.05 
citibank 0.34 0.99 0.48 0.50 
credit_suisse 0.00 0.99 0.18 0.17 
deutsche_bank 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.03 
hsbc 0.20 0.67 0.25 0.14 
jp_morgan 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 
lloyds 0.02 0.13 0.37 0.41 
rabo 0.05 0.97 0.18 0.19 
rbs 0.00 0.18 0.35 0.08 
societe_generale 0.02 0.78 0.33 0.30 
ubs 0.00 0.97 0.33 0.29 
     
     
LIBOR-OIS MAXLAG=2  ADF test statistic p-value 
Bank \ Period 1 2 3 1-3 
barclays 0.00 0.67 0.26 0.54 
citibank 0.00 0.66 0.27 0.50 
credit_suisse 0.00 0.71 0.28 0.55 
deutsche_bank 0.00 0.73 0.14 0.52 
hsbc 0.00 0.63 0.26 0.53 
jp_morgan 0.00 0.61 0.28 0.50 
lloyds 0.00 0.61 0.35 0.49 
rabo 0.00 0.61 0.20 0.47 
rbs 0.00 0.67 0.36 0.57 
societe_generale 0.00 0.52 0.36 0.53 
ubs 0.00 0.72 0.16 0.52 
     
CDS Liquidity MAXLAG=2  ADF test statistic p-value 
Bank \ Period 1 2 3 1-3 
barclays 0.07 0.96 0.00 0.00 
citibank 0.35 0.00 0.05 0.00 
credit_suisse 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.00 
deutsche_bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
hsbc 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 
jp_morgan 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.00 
lloyds 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
rabo 0.18 0.98 0.00 0.00 
rbs 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 
societe_generale 0.00 0.88 0.02 0.00 
ubs 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 
 
  
 
 
Appendix 3. CDS Libor Basis of Libor panel banks over (4/1/2003-13/12/2013) (note different scales in ver-
tical-axis) 
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